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ABSTRACT 
 
An overarching goal of my dissertation is to delineate social systemic processes as first 
and foremost embodied, experiential processes.  I argue that such processes manifest 
through and depend upon the organism’s affective integration with her environment.  
Whereby, I delineate concepts like alienation and agency as manifesting through an 
affective intelligibility.  Symbolic alienation, then, represents a circumstance in which 
institutional narratives purport moral or aesthetic truths that denigrate and deny the 
organism’s affective understanding of a circumstance.  Agentic growth refers to the 
organism’s affective adaptation to an environment.  Such growth follows from the 
process of working through experiential discordance (i.e., the disturbance of experiential 
flow or continuity) and manifests as a newfound sense of trust and understanding.  
Experiential discordance is an unavoidable occurrence because the organism-
environment relationship is a dynamic one.  If the organism is unable to mitigate and 
repair such discordance, she will face the threat of traumatization.  Furthermore, those 
who disrupt the conventional-institutional organization or channeling of experience take 
on the character of dirt and thereby represent a dirty Other.  If institutions react to the 
troubling, dirty Other by means of systemic repression, rather than genuine 
communication and reintegration, then said dirty Other takes on the character of shit.  In 
such a circumstance, the presence of the dirty Other likely reveals deep, social systemic 
inadequacies and thereby ruptures the collective’s existential confidence and 
praxeological competence.   
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
 
It is customary to begin a scholarly piece with a thesis statement.  There is good reason 
for this.  The writer who states a thesis upfront lends holistic clarity to the work.  
However, every theoretical project entails a set of epistemological assumptions.  The 
affirmation of a theoretical thesis, then, necessarily entails the affirmation of particular 
assumptions.  Although these basic suppositions are typically implicit to any given 
intellectual piece, the scholarly community does not regard them as secondary.  This 
disposition is evidenced by the scholarly propensity to group seemingly disparate works 
by the assumptions they share.   
There are two primary reasons for why this seemingly latent content garners 
much intellectual salience.  The first reason is that despite the magnitude of their 
eloquence and sophistication, a particular set of theoretical propositions with faulty or 
lackluster epistemological underpinnings demonstrates little intellectual value.  The 
second reason is that the underlying assumptions of a work may reinforce or challenge a 
reader’s experiential reality.  To understand this, we must acknowledge that 
epistemological constructions demonstrate a relationship with the body.  They reinforce 
or challenge existential certitude and bolster or undermine affective-experiential 
stability.  With that said, the present discussion, first and foremost, attempts to establish 
and make clear the epistemological ground upon which the reader will figuratively walk.  
Without further ado, then, the assumptions of the present work are as follows: 
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1) The sociocultural world is real in both the material and ideal sense and, 
therefore, constitutes a reality external to the individual psyche.   
2) As forms of articulation, language, signs, symbols and any other mode of 
representation can, at best, approximate but never capture this reality. 
3) As features of the environment, language, signs, symbols and any other 
mode of representation demonstrate a real force upon and within 
experience.  These objects, then, are part and parcel of reality.   
4) The organism’s interaction with reality necessarily occurs through the 
mode of experience.   
5) Experience is necessarily embodied and affective.  This implies that the 
organism’s experience of reality is also embodied and affective; which 
implies that the organism’s experience of the symbolic is embodied and 
affective as well.   
These assumptions present us with two key theoretical problems.  First, having 
acknowledged that the organism cannot  experience symbolic reality outside of her 
corporeality—outside of her affective constitution—how are we to understand the 
process of symbolic alienation?  Second, if the whole of the subject’s existence, both 
active and passive, is corporeal—i.e., if all actions (and nonactions) elicit an affective 
response—what then is the nature of agency?   
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Addressing the first question, we first acknowledge that alienation, here, refers to 
an experiential distance from (and perhaps misunderstanding of) the symbolic.1  To say 
this, however, does not suggest that alienated symbols are wholly devoid of affect.  Even 
within the symbolically alienated experience, symbols maintain an affective (albeit 
dysfunctional) presence.  Symbolic alienation, then, is a circumstance in which a 
symbolic intelligibility contrasts with and does violence to affective-experiential 
understanding.  Such is the case when institutional narratives purporting moral or 
aesthetic truths also work to denigrate or repress experiences to the contrary.  With that 
said, the organism’s affective intelligibility reveals her alienation; it reveals her 
embodied disengagement with an environing.  Such revelation may manifest as a sense 
of mistrust or unease.  Wherefore, the organism’s affective intelligibility—although it is 
in dialogue with and in part a product of sociocultural influences—will serve as the 
subject’s personal articulation of the real.  Despite, or rather because of, this potential for 
idiosyncrasy, the affective intelligibility is always authentic (at least to the organism’s 
present experience).   
Moreover, a working concordance can exist between the organism’s affective 
constitution and the symbolic forms of her environment; yet her ability to maintain this 
concordance without interruption is another matter.  The point the reader should take 
from this stipulation is that symbolic alienation (as I defined it above) is not an essential 
                                                 
1 I derive this notion of alienation from Erich Fromm’s definition of said concept.  He states, “Alienation 
is essentially experiencing the world and oneself passively, receptively, as the subject separated from the 
object” (1961: 37).  Hence symbolic alienation is the circumstance in which the organism’s experiential 
understanding is separate or distance from the symbolic logics that inundate her present experience.   
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condition of the experiential.  Likewise, the reader should note that the flow of 
experience cannot sustain the absence of alienation.     
To address the second question, regarding the nature of agency, we must first 
acknowledge that agency refers to both the structural-environmental freedom to act and 
to one’s personal ability to act (i.e., one’s praxeological efficacy), which springs from 
and bolsters existential confidence.2 A primary thesis of the present work is that such 
agency is possible because of emotion, not in spite of it.  William James (1980) 
understood this well.  His discussion of emotion employs a Darwinian sensibility—a 
sensibility that emphasizes the adaptive role of organismal functions.  Charles Darwin 
(1859), after all, introduced the idea of growth through adaptive processes.3  Likewise, 
James (1956) argued that emotion enables the organism’s active adaptation to an 
environment.  In other words, emotion grounds action—not as a stimulus-response 
relationship, but rather as the ability to apprehend and create a potential future.  
Accordingly, emotional engagement implies that the organism is able to act despite a 
potential dearth of contextual information or environmental cues regarding the 
appropriate lines of action.   
James’ (1897) illustration of an Alpine climber’s expedition exemplifies this 
stipulation.  As his story unfolds, James tells us about a climber who confronts a 
                                                 
2 This is my definition of agency and I believe it corresponds with the definition Giddens gives.  He states, 
“I  shall define action or agency as the stream of actual or contemplated causal interventions of corporeal 
beings in the ongoing process of events-in-the-world” (1993: 81).  Yet I define agency with two 
dimensions, one referencing structural opportunity and the other personal ability, to illustrate that the 
opportunity for agentic action does not necessarily entail the achievement of said action.    
3 We should also note that Darwin spoke at length about the role cooperation in evolutionary processes.    
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potentially perilous leap.  He further tells us that this climber, despite not having such 
knowledge, must believe in his ability to accomplish the feat.  He explains, 
Not a victory is gained, not a deed of faithfulness or courage is done, except upon 
a maybe; not a service, not a sally of generosity, not a scientific exploration or 
experiment or textbook, that may not be a mistake. It is only by risking our 
persons from one hour to another that we live at all. And often enough our faith 
beforehand in an uncertified result is the only thing that makes the result come 
true. Suppose, for instance, that you are climbing a mountain and have worked 
yourself into a position from which the only escape is by a terrible leap. Have 
faith that you can successfully make it, and your feet are nerved to its 
accomplishment. But mistrust yourself, and think of all the sweet things you have 
heard the scientists say of maybes, and you will hesitate so long that, at last, all 
unstrung and trembling, and launching yourself in a moment of despair, you roll 
into the abyss. In such a case (and it belongs to an enormous class), the part of 
wisdom as well as of courage is to believe what is in the line of your needs, for 
only by such belief is the need fulfilled. Refuse to believe, and you shall indeed 
be right, for you shall irretrievably perish. But believe, and again you shall be 
right, for you shall save yourself. You make one or the other of two possible 
universes true by your trust or mistrust, —both universes having been only 
maybes, in this particular, before you contributed your act. (59)  
 
The belief and trust of which James speaks here constitute an affective-embodied 
understanding.  As James highlights in the above quotation, “faith in an uncertified result 
is the only thing that makes the result come true.”  We may acknowledge, then, that 
affects facilitate—but do not determine—agency.   
Moreover, agency is not inherent to the social object or actor, nor is it inherent to 
any particular socio-historical juncture or structure.  We often see essentialist or taken-
for-granted depictions of agency within much of contemporary sociology.  High 
modernity theorists, for example, contend that the structures of the present age constitute 
a greater degree of agency than that of “traditional” epochs.  Whereas these theorists—
such as Zygmunt Bauman, Anthony Giddens and Ulrich Beck—acknowledge the 
systemic presence of alienation in the late modern age, they further argue that it is 
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concomitant with systemic opportunity.  I argue, however, that if scholars view agency 
as a part of and implicated by the concordance that exists between a body and her 
environment, then said scholars should be suspicious of any claims made about 
opportunities that arise from alienating circumstances.  In other words, alienation does 
not facilitate the body-environment concordance that makes agentic action possible.      
 
Structure, the Embodied Experience and the Question of Agency 
Zygmunt Bauman describes the late modern age as a liquid one.  He employs this liquid 
metaphor to highlight the uprooted, ephemeral character of modern living.  Bauman 
states, “‘Liquid modern’ is a society in which the conditions under which its members 
act change faster than it takes the way of acting to consolidate into habits and routines” 
(Bauman 2005:1).  If we accept this claim, we may also acknowledge that the 
heightened dynamism of a liquid society will likely disrupt (if not wholly impede) the 
potential for a working concordance between the organism’s affective constitution and 
the surrounding sociocultural structures.  This stipulation corresponds with Bauman’s 
idea that those who live a liquid life must maintain hyper vigilance and the ability to 
adjust to ever-changing circumstances, lest they suffer social and cultural vitiation.  He 
states,  
In a liquid modern society, individual achievements cannot be solidified into 
lasting possessions because, in no time, assets turn into liabilities and abilities 
into disabilities.  Conditions of action and strategies designed to respond to them 
age quickly and become obsolete before the actors have a chance to learn them 
properly….  Extrapolating from past events to predict future trends becomes ever 
more risky and all too often misleading. Trustworthy calculations are 
increasingly difficult to make, while foolproof prognoses are all but 
unimaginable: most if not all variables in the equations are unknown, whereas no 
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estimates of their future trends can be treated as fully and truly reliable (2005:1-
2).  
 
Bauman rightly acknowledges that the structural inadequacies of the modern 
environment impede the organism’s ability to manage information (i.e., faulty 
calculations, prognoses, estimations).  Yet the language of information management 
does little to capture the organism’s lived (embodied) experience.  We should also 
knowledge that these inadequacies implicate the organism’s ability to stay affectively 
engaged; the organism cannot maintain a sense of Heimlich.4   
Consequently, the liquid life constitutes more than a circumstance in which the 
organism does not know how to act—how to plan appropriately for her future.  If the 
issue were one of simply “staying in the know,” hyper-vigilance, though burdensome, 
could arguably be a sufficient mode of being in the world.  In other words, the organism 
could competently navigate the sociocultural world by readily acquiring and employing 
new information.  But the circumstance is not such that the organism’s primary difficulty 
is the maintenance of a contextually relevant knowledge base.  As Bauman himself 
suggests, the liquid life is one in which the organism is unable to acquire the appropriate 
habits to functionally integrate with her present environment.  I argue, then, that she 
experiences an embodied disengagement with the sociocultural forms that inundate her 
existence.  Her lack of experiential understanding (which encompasses but is not 
semantically interchangeable with an inability to calculate and predict future trends), 
then, reveals itself as her most encompassing concern.   
                                                 
4 Heimlich, as I employ said concept here, refers to a familiarity that elicits confidence and security.   
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Such a disruption constitutes more than the functionality of her cognitive 
faculties; her affective intelligibility also demonstrates incongruities. Lack of knowledge 
does not threaten her ability to act, to push forward; rather, lack of (experiential) 
understanding does.  A breakdown in understanding, then, threatens the very integrity of 
her being (a point to which I return in chapter three).  Wherefore, I argue that a failure to 
understand interferes with self-efficacy and gives way to inertia.  Looking to Bauman’s 
work, we could say the organism becomes inert in a world that refuses to create a space 
for said inertia; liquid structures will not cease to impinge upon her.  Praxeological 
inertia perpetuates experiential violence, undermines existential trust and approaches the 
traumatic (an idea I explore further in chapter two).   
Yet the systemic inadequacies of liquid modernity have not engendered mass 
traumata.  Most modern organisms seem to buffer or circumvent such a consequence.  If 
we accept that the organism lives in a liquid world (as Bauman argues), and we accept 
that she increasingly confronts experiential violence (as I argue), how are we to make 
sense of her ability to cope in this world?  What mitigating factors are at play?   
First we should acknowledge, following Bauman, that the liquid modern world 
does facilitate particular modes of being and concomitant habits; the most pronounced 
being the insatiable consumer and her uninhibited consumption.  Bauman (2007; 2005) 
explains that liquid life constitutes an existence in which the individual judges all objects 
and others in regards to their consumption value.  He further notes that the liquid culture 
renders the organism’s satisfaction impermanent.  Wherefore, it would seem that a liquid 
culture brings the organism’s affective constitution in line with the liquid society’s ever 
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changing structural conditions.  Hence, as an insatiable consumer she seems readily able 
to relinquish (throwaway) one mode of being to consume another.  Could we argue, 
then, that the organism has achieved integration?   
Before affirming such a claim, we should recognize that such a circumstance 
does not represent integration in the Durkheimian sense.  Emile Durkheim (1893), after 
all, viewed integration as a cooperative endeavor.5  The insatiable, liquid consumer does 
not demonstrate a communal or an accommodative sensibility; rather, Bauman notes, 
this individual disposes of others once they lose their consumption value.  The implied 
logic of liquid culture, then, is that solidarity is a potential liability.  Furthermore, the 
insatiable consumer is a quintessential example of Durkheim’s (1897) conceptualization 
of the anomic character type, a disposition characterized by derangement.  With that 
said, we should not confuse this particular mode of being in the social world, one that is 
liquid consumption centered, as harmonious or functional.  While the organism can 
adopt (but not adapt to6) the role of insatiable consumer, she is unable to sustain a 
foundational sense of trust in a consumption-driven environment.  Wherefore, we cannot 
characterize liquid praxis as agentic.7  
Still, we have yet to answer the question at hand: given the destructive qualities 
of liquid living, how do we explain the absence of mass traumata in present day society?  
The answer, I believe, is that the liquid modern organism develops a prevailing sense of 
                                                 
5 This is made evident in his discussion of organic solidarity, which constitutes a togetherness achieved by 
means of a functional division of labor (Durkheim 1983).   
6 For the present discussion I will reserve the use of “adaptation” to reference the organism’s embodied 
adjustments that contribute to the holistic functionality of her being in the social world.    
7 At least not in my present experiential-existential use of the term.   
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mistrust.  While mistrust is far from an ideal sensibility, it enables the organism to cope. 
In other words, such a mode of being still constitutes a connection to the world, a 
reference point from which the organism can create and maintain experiential 
understanding (tenuous as it may be).    
 Nevertheless, the reader may remain dissatisfied with this explanation.  She may 
note that not everyone in the liquid modern world conforms to liquid ideals and acts.  
The rise of minimalist movements (those who disavow the practice of commercial 
consumption) and mindfulness circles (those who stay in the know of and act in response 
to the larger social problems of modern living) serve as evidence for this claim.  
Affirming this contention, we may acknowledge that it is a mistake to assume the whole 
of the contemporary West constitutes a homogenous culture.  But we should also 
acknowledge that some (if not many) contemporary, counter cultures constitute persons 
who are relatively inauthentic in their concerns—that their alternative lifestyles have less 
to do with a mindful challenge to the status quo and more to do with the desire to 
consume fashionable identities.   
Still, to suggest that liquid modernity, or any culture, represents the absolute 
whole of a historical juncture is to commit a theoretical solecism.  Generalizations of this 
kind give way to academic elitism.  By means of such stipulations, theorists position 
themselves as intellectually and morally above a “complacent” populace.  Perhaps the 
claim that the liquid modern represents the prevailing aura of or fear for the 
contemporary age serves as a more reasonable theoretical stance.  Moreover, we may 
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refrain from a portrayal of the organism as a cultural dope, unable to resist or subvert the 
structural incentives of the historical moment.    
We should also note that despite his disturbing portrayal of liquid society, 
Bauman is not a fatalist.  He (1995; 2001) asserts that modern life constitutes a 
newfound potential for forms togetherness and concomitant moral action.  Following 
Jean-François Lyotard (1979), Bauman contends that the contemporary period is one in 
which we can no longer assume the diffuse acceptance of any one particular narrative.  
Because the structural arrangements of liquid society change erratically and often, grand 
narratives or ideologies no longer demonstrate hegemonic status.  The resulting 
circumstance, Bauman believes, is one in which the members of society can readily 
circumvent the dictates of convention and confront one another as whole selves, rather 
than identities partial to situational norms and procedures.  Anthony Giddens (1991a) 
makes a similar claim.  He argues that the contemporary epoch has given rise to the pure 
relationship, another self-referential form of togetherness.  He states, “In contrast to 
close personal ties in traditional contexts, the pure relationship is not anchored in 
external conditions of social or economic life—it is, as it were, free-floating” (89).   
I will return to and give an elaborate discussion of these ideas in the final chapter 
of this dissertation.  Presently, however, I leave the reader with the following questions 
to consider.  If we accept the claim that the present day organism lacks a stable 
sociocultural backdrop to facilitate and guide her action, how are we to understand her 
embodied experience in the world?  Will this experience constitute a sense of trust or 
mistrust? Will this experience constitute a sense of security or insecurity?  Such 
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questions intimate a concern for the organism’s affective integration with an 
environment.  The point I wish to make is that the organism’s affective well being 
grounds her sense of existential confidence and praxeological competence.   
With that said, we should acknowledge that both Bauman and Giddens give 
significant attention to affective experiences in their work.  Yet (as I discuss in the final 
chapter) both scholars hypothesize about the potential for new forms of togetherness in a 
way that loses sight of the experiential body and its vulnerabilities. Ulrich Beck also 
delineates the contemporary world as one that facilitates structural potential.  He 
contends that the contemporary age ushers in a dialogic imagination in which, “…the 
clash of cultures and rationalities within one’s own life…” (2002:18) reflects the 
contents of an internal other.  He elaborates, “The dialogic imagination corresponds to 
the coexistence of rival ways of life in the individual experience, which makes it a 
matter of fate to compare, reflect, criticize, understand, [and] combine contradictory 
certainties” (18).  The individual, Beck believes, now has the opportunity to engage in a 
global reflexivity that incorporates an imagined, dissimilar other.  Consequently, the 
modern individual can now engage in local praxis with global awareness.   
Giddens identifies the historical moment as facilitating a global reflexivity as 
well.  He explains, “Mechanised technologies of communication…. form an essential 
element of the reflexivity of modernity and of the discontinuities which have torn the 
modern away from the traditional” (Giddens 1991b: 77). Such reflexivity, Giddens 
argues, incorporates the global flows of information produced by modernity’s abstract 
 13 
 
systems.  The individual now constructs her self-identity with a broad understanding of 
national and global affairs.    
However, when we place embodiment or embodied integration with an 
environment at the center of structural analysis, we may acknowledge that Beck and 
Giddens’ delineation of a newly emerging, “glocal” self is not without epistemological 
problems.  I hold that Beck (2002) and Giddens (1991a) overemphasize the moral 
agency that emerges from macro-systemic processes given their portrayals of the modern 
environment (a runaway juggernaut and a world replete with risk).  Such conditions are 
antagonistic toward the organism’s primary mode of being in the world, embodied 
experience.  Global reflexivity, then, is not inherently agentic.  If said reflexivity 
threatens the organism’s sense of “ontological security,”8 the organism may respond 
defensively; she may affectively disengage from the other.  With that said, a rupture to 
ontological security may very well lead to experiential growth,9 but the organism must 
achieve this growth—a process psychoanalysts refer to as working through.  In other 
words, we cannot assume that structural potential will manifest as advantageous praxis.  
Agency and growth are not inherent to any structural circumstance or historical moment.  
If the organism is to take advantage of structural opportunity and demonstrate self-
                                                 
8 This is a concept Giddens (1991a) employs.  The reader may find it interesting (or perhaps paradoxical) 
that Giddens acknowledges that the conditions of high modernity threaten the organism’s ontological 
security.   
9 I hold to the idea that when the organism overcomes or emerges from an experiential-existential 
disruption, she achieves more than a functional concordance with her environing; she also achieves 
experiential growth.  In saying this, I adhere to John Dewey’s stipulation that, “…recovery is never [a] 
mere return to a prior state, for it is enriched by the state of disparity and resistance through which it has 
successfully passed” (1934: 535).  
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efficacy, then her body must attain concordance with the environment.  This process 
involves the efforts of the subject and the social.    
In making the aforesaid criticisms of the high modernity theory, I do not wish to 
convey the message that the structural conditions of late modern society necessarily 
hinder the individual’s ability to function and are, consequently, devoid of any enabling 
potential.  The message I do wish to convey, however, is that high modernity (or any 
modernity for that matter) does not constitute an inherent historical trajectory or 
historical end point—utopian, dystopian or otherwise.  Although the high modernity 
theorists delineate an affective subject, they look to socio-structural arrangements and 
opportunities, rather than the experiential, corporeal being, as a measure of agency and 
growth.   
To be fair to Giddens, however, we may still acknowledge that he offers an 
astute conceptualization of social structure.  His (1984) stipulation that social structures 
both enable and constrain social action and actors is a valuable one.  An interpretation of 
structure as such provides an apt connection to a sociology of embodiment.  Embodied 
processes, after all, both enable and constrain.  We may recognize, as Giddens (1991a; 
1991b) does, that affective processes like hope and trust orient the organism and enable 
her to circumvent potential peril.  Likewise, these sentiments may blind the organism to 
approaching dangers and thereby lead her astray.  Also, the body’s plethora of needs 
motivate the organism to engage in interaction and forge new connections in the world.  
Yet these needs are not infinitely plastic; consequently, the organism cannot adapt to any 
and all conditions to fulfill said needs.   
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Furthermore, the high modernity theorists are not alone in failing to analyze 
agentic action in respect to the organism’s affective constitution.  There is a great deal of 
sociological work that makes this mistake.  I do not say this to imply that the disparate 
theories which make up the usual sociological corpus are homogenous reflections of the 
whole; rather, I say this to suggest that many theories share an implicit premise that 
fundamentally influences scholarly depictions of social interaction and experience.  
 Said premise is the Cartesian dualism; an idea that perpetuates a conceptual 
distinction between mind-body as res cogitans and res extensa respectively.  The 
implicit presence of the dualism within mainstream scholarship demonstrates an 
ostensible absurdity; these works will, at times, openly acknowledge that a mind-body 
binary is problematic or outright false and then proceed to stipulate mental and corporal 
processes as conceptually distinct—as if an acknowledgement of the problem served as 
an alternative to the problem.  We will likely find, however, that this contradiction is not 
the result of intellectual negligence or apathy, but rather an inability to see beyond 
certain taken for granted assumptions about mentation and its relationship to affect.   
 
An Embodied Mind Is Not a Prison  
Scholars often delineate mentation as a process that occurs above or even in opposition 
to affect.  Contemporary discussions of social reflexivity are typical offenders.  The 
Goffman school of Symbolic Interactionism, for example, places paramount emphasis 
on the actor’s ability to strategically role-take by means of a ritualistic appreciation for 
embarrassment avoidance, identity construction and the negotiation of situational 
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definitions, but fails to fully capture the embodied nature of these reflexive practices.  
Although they emphasize the role of particular affects (such as embarrassment and 
shame) within social interaction, many symbolic interactionists portray affective 
processes as secondary to cognitive ones (Barbalet 2009).   
The irony of this is that Symbolic Interactionism is, in part, an offshoot of 
Jamesian Pragmatism.  Jack Barbalet (2009) suggests that while Symbolic Interactionists 
adopt James’ notion of a reflexive self, they fail to capture the pragmatic emphasis upon 
the agentic character of emotion.  When we look specifically to Erving Goffman’s 
(1959; 1963) work, we have the sense that emotions are the reactionary outcomes of, 
rather than a means to, social interaction.  In other words, emotions do not enable the 
actor to manage the situational context; rather, they serve as punishments for loss of face 
and rewards for status-role verification or elevation.  Goffman’s offshoot of Symbolic 
Interactionism, then, presents us with a theoretical subject who, contrary to our 
epistemological assumptions, does not affectively engage symbols; rather, she employs 
symbols to circumvent or control the affective (i.e., her feelings and the feelings of 
others).  Goffman’s theorizing is not without merit.  Organism’s do undertake symbolic 
interaction to avoid embarrassment.  Yet the role of affect in social action extends 
beyond that of an interactional burden or sensory prison.  In the next chapter of this 
dissertation I synthesize Goffman’s ideas with those of psychoanalysis.  In so doing, I 
attempt to illustrate an organism who affectively reaches for a connection to her 
environment.    
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Toward a New Understanding of the Body’s Structural Role  
 Accepting Bauman’s portrayal of liquid modern destruction, I contend that many 
present day institutions facilitate pervasive anomie.  The organism’s inability to act or 
lack of efficacy that results from late modern turmoil overshadows the newfound 
freedoms or choices made available to her from said turmoil.  To be fair to the late 
modernity theorists, they acknowledge and discuss many of these dysfunctional features 
at great lengths.  Giddens (1991a) and Bauman (2000), in particular, suggest that this 
epoch operates as a runaway world in which modern individuals have lost ultimate 
control.  Their hope—although we may now recognize such hope as a dwindling one—is 
that the contradictions of the late modern age will facilitate the possibility for systemic 
restructuring and experiential renewal.   
My intention is not to replace the hope they bestow upon modern structures with 
a newfound fatalism.  Rather, I contest and renounce the conditions for which they are 
hopeful.  They argue that the present age demonstrates the emergence of a new, radically 
benevolent togetherness: a the pure relationship (Giddens 1991a) that transcends moral 
dictates (Bauman 1993) and, consequently, facilitates a newfound respect for the 
otherness of the other (Beck 2002).  I, to the contrary, contend that the pure relationship 
is an unsustainable fiction.  We cannot approximate such a relationship in the empirical 
world; therefore, its conceptual use lacks theoretical intelligibility. Furthermore, such an 
understanding forgoes a genuine concern for embodied experience, which is existentially 
inextricable from the organism’s cultural environing.   
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For these scholars, then, the late modern age constitutes a crisis that facilitates 
pervasive risk and anxiety and newfound possibility and hope.  The fundamental premise 
of this thesis is that the conditions of the late modern age transcend or undermine the 
material and ideological constraints of previous epochs.  Late modernity theorists derive 
this postulate from the postmodern postulate that the historical moment is one in which 
time and space have virtually collapsed and many individuals can now explore and 
discover new modes of being in the world.  I accept this claim.   
However, these theorists further suggest that present social conditions facilitate 
the opportunity for new moralities and solidarities that demonstrate a sincere concern 
and respect for a global or alien other.  While I accept that such sincerity is possible, I 
hold, and will attempt to demonstrate, that the propensity for said sincerity bears no 
essential relationship with the present historical moment.   
My theoretical stance is a meliorist one.  In criticizing the late modernity 
theorists, I do not reject the sentiments of hope and progress; rather, I wish to break from 
a linear, deterministic construction of social development.  I propose that the social 
world is an ongoing project without culmination.  The epistemological decision to be 
made, then, is what conceptual reference scholars should use to judge the alienating or 
agentic character of a particular, historical moment.  The late modernity theorists seem 
to establish the individual’s efficacy traversing identities through space and time as said 
reference.  Such a measure is not without intellectual worth; it highlights the political use 
value of particular structural arrangements.  But how does it compare to the reference I 
have chosen, the organism’s embodied integration with an environment?  
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There are several advantages to my particular choice.  To begin with, it orients 
theory construction toward an aesthetic sensibility that resonates with experiential 
understanding.  Theoretical discourse, then, may serve as a humanism in that readers can 
intimately engage with the epistemological constructions they employ.  Secondly, the 
body serves as a conceptually synchronic reference point.  Without such a reference, 
scholars may reevaluate diachronic structures without end.  Such scholarship ultimately 
loses explanatory power to the principle of absolute relativism.  The difference between 
structural enablement and constraint, then, simply becomes a matter of ideological 
perspective.   
With that said, I now turn to the remaining three chapters, in which I attempt to 
further explore and develop the theoretical ideas touched upon in this introduction.  In 
chapter two, I discuss the embodied relationship an organism has with an environment in 
respect to her ability to circumvent traumatic experiences and thereby maintain a 
foundational sense of trust.  In chapter three, I explore the idea of experiential 
understanding and how this concept relates to the embodied experience of dirt.  In this 
chapter I further explore how the experiential realm dirties systemic praxes and 
collective fantasies of purity.  In chapter four, the final chapter, I attempt to apply the 
theoretical scaffolding developed throughout the dissertation.  The subjects of analysis in 
this final chapter are Albert Camus’ novel, The Stranger, and the Courts-Martial of 
Specialist Steven A. Ribordy.  Though differing in significant ways, I illustrate that these 
accounts demonstrate interesting parallels with notable implications for a sociology of 
embodiment.   
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CHAPTER II 
TOWARD A SOCIOANALYTIC THEORY OF ORDINARY INTERACTION: 
MANAGING TRUST AND TRAUMA IN EVERYDAY LIFE 
 
In the discussion that follows I argue that a disruption to the psyche’s ability to achieve 
and maintain integration with a sociocultural environment undermines the organism’s 
sense of basic trust.  Consequently, she may experience this disruption as traumatic.  
Because the relationship between psyche and environment is a dynamic one, a disruption 
to its concordance is a likely occurrence.  Accordingly, the potential for trauma, 
although not always great, maintains a presence within the organism’s everyday 
interaction.  Most ordinary interactions, then, occur in a context in which the organism 
attempts to establish and maintain a sense of trust while avoiding or mitigating the threat 
of trauma. With that said, I delineate trust and trauma as representing affective modes of 
being; they encompass a great deal of the organism’s holistic experience.   
Furthermore, I suggest that we regard trust and trauma as opposite poles of a 
conceptual continuum.  As the organism negotiates and manages her everyday life, she 
approaches one pole or the other.  Such a theory has the potential to reorient 
contemporary delineations of self and society and concomitant discourses.  Presently, 
however, we will limit our concerns to those ideas that contribute to or implicate our 
understanding of how the organism navigates the relationship between trust and trauma 
within ordinary circumstances.  
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A Proposal 
The organism’s experiential reach for trust and her avoidance or mitigation of the 
traumatic necessarily implicate both her psyche and the sociocultural environment.  To 
capture the theoretical spectrum and nuance of the intersection between psychical and 
social praxis, then, requires a synthesis of perspectives.  If we look to Freud’s late 
writings, we may acknowledge that psychoanalysis was well on its way to becoming a 
psychoanalytic sociology—or at least divulging fundamentally sociological implications.  
Hans Loewald’s work extends this trajectory; it comprises ideas, such as the instinctual 
oscillation between self dynamism and atonement, that signify the social connotations of 
cathexis and catharsis.  In building this opus, Loewald notably works through the pitfalls 
of Freud’s concepts without inventing new terminology and, therefore, a seemingly 
separate discourse (Chodorow, 2003; Teicholz, 1999).  Moreover, he—unlike many 
other neo-Freudians who polemically eschew one psychoanalytic offshoot for another—
synthesizes ostensibly different strands of thought into a unified whole (Chodorow, 
1989).   
The theoretical linchpin, however, that connects Loewald’s work to the present 
discussion of “trust and trauma in everyday life” is his unique delineation of the 
structural theory of mind.  I argue that Loewald’s conceptualization of the psychic 
substructures: id, ego, and superego constitutes the following sociocultural relationships: 
without structure, structuring, and structured.  To be clear, Loewald did not develop this 
specific typology; nonetheless, I contend that it conveys theoretical relationships that are 
semantically present within his writing. These relationships are as follows: the 
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structuring ego is an agency that organizes or channels affective energy in response to a 
dynamic, sociocultural environment; the structured superego represents an enduring 
structure that is the culmination of the aforesaid ego activity; and the without structure id 
represents the irreducible form of the organism’s affective constitution—that which is 
without and resistant to ego organization and, therefore, sociocultural influence.  
Suggesting that the id is without sociocultural structure does not imply that it lacks any 
structure; its irreducible character, Loewald (1978a) tells us, is that of primary 
narcissism or the undifferentiated, instinctual will.  Also, the structured superego 
struggles to work with, rather than against, the expression of id’s irreducible form.  
Integrating this understanding of mind into a sociological framework, I argue that 
the superego orients the organism’s experiential navigation of social context.  We may 
refer to the “development” of such an orientation as approaching primary trust.  This 
form of trust constitutes and enables social action, integration and functionality.  A 
rupture or violation to superego organization may undermine the organism’s sense of 
trust.  If said rupture is significant, the experience may be one of traumatization, which 
constitutes psychical inertia, experiential violence and organism-environment 
maladjustment. 
 
Basic Trust as a Sensibility 
The concept of trust demonstrates a strong presence within contemporary sociology.  
Much of this work delineates the function of trust as managing risks, reducing 
complexity and increasing predictability (e.g., Luhmann 1979; 2000; Sztompka 1999).  
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While these ideas are not without merit, we should acknowledge that they demonstrate a 
cognitive-reflexive bias.  In accordance with a cognitive-reflexive emphasis, to 
demonstrate trust is to, “…choose one action in preference to others in spite of the 
possibility of being disappointed…” (Luhmann 2000: 97).  Such an understanding 
assumes a one-to-one correspondence between one’s “actual” preference and her 
“conscious” choice.  However, with the introduction of common psychoanalytic ideas, 
such as the repressed wish and unconscious ambivalence, the empirical relationship 
between preference and choice demonstrates heightened nuance and ambiguity; 
consequently, their conceptual relationship becomes ever the more difficult to ascertain.    
Also, the cognitive-reflexive depiction tends to focus on trust as a characteristic 
that a social actor confers upon another or acquires by another’s conferral.  For example, 
Piotr Sztompka contends that, “…trust is a bet on the future contingent actions of others” 
(1999: 69).  The point that Sztompka wishes to make salient is that risk is an inherent 
feature of trust.  On this stipulation, I agree with him; yet, I have a contention with his 
gambling analogy.  Likening trust to a bet suggests that the risk of trust overshadows the 
agency it facilitates.  Moreover, we cannot accept the idea that genuine trust (as a 
feeling) is a thing one confers.  Whereas the organism may permit herself to be 
experientially open and vulnerable, she cannot readily demonstrate competence in or feel 
confident about her openness.  
With that said, Sztompka does recognize that through the accumulation of 
particular experiences the organism may develop the psychological propensity to trust.  
This is similar to how I presently employ the trust concept. Thus, a distinction is in 
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order.  We may regard the social occurrence in which one grants, but does not 
necessarily feel, trust as secondary trust.  In contradistinction to secondary trust, primary 
trust is an affective disposition; it constitutes a somatically developed integration 
between an organism and her sociocultural environment.  Furthermore, primary trust is 
less of a cognitive choice (though it does involve choice), than it is an affective signal 
derived from an embodied percipience or reflexivity.  Such a disposition enables the 
organism to act in the absence of knowledge and in the presence of uncertainty.   
I largely derive this conception of trust from Erik Erikson’s (1950) notion of 
basic trust.  Introducing this idea, Erikson suggests that the creation and maintenance of 
basic trust is not wholly dependent on the organism’s attainment of “essential” objects 
and conditions.  He elaborates,  
There are… few frustrations… which the growing child cannot endure if the 
frustration leads to the ever-renewed experience of greater sameness and stronger 
continuity of development, toward a final integration of the individual life cycle 
with some meaningful wider belongingness. (249)   
 
The quality of the organism-environment relationship is fruitful, then, if it facilitates for 
the organism a sense of wholeness and integration.  The organism requires a sense that 
she is in and of a particular environment in a meaningful way, in the sense that she 
belongs.  In regard to her experience, the world presents itself as familiar; she may 
navigate it with confidence and competence. However, as the environment changes, the 
organism’s sense of wholeness and integration may falter.  The world becomes 
precarious and she responds with hesitancy.   
If she loses a meaningful connection to the environment—and subsequently 
experiences the world as alien and threatening—her basic trust will dissipate.  I argue 
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that this process of maintaining a meaningful connection to the world is the same 
process by which the ego maintains a connection between the organization of the 
superego and the environment’s sociocultural structure.  By suggesting such, I orient the 
discussion of basic trust toward sociological concerns.   
Anthony Giddens also incorporates Erikson’s notion of basic trust into a 
sociological framework.  His articulation of Erikson’s idea largely parallels my present 
interpretation.  He states, “Trust in the existential anchorings of reality in an emotional, 
and to some degree in a cognitive, sense rests on confidence in the reliability of 
persons…” (1991a: 38).  According to Giddens, this particular form of trust has 
important implications for modern societies.  He explains, 
…[T]he nature of modern institutions is deeply bound up with the mechanisms of 
trust in abstract systems, especially trust in expert systems. In conditions of 
modernity, the future is always open, not just in terms of the ordinary 
contingency of things, but in terms of the reflexivity of knowledge in relation to 
which social practices are organised. This counterfactual, future-oriented 
character of modernity is largely structured by trust vested in abstract systems—
which by its very nature is filtered by the trustworthiness of established expertise. 
(1991b: 84-85) 
 
Trust in modernity’s abstract, expert systems, Giddens elaborates, facilitates a newfound 
reflexivity in which the modern individual constructs her self-identity in response to 
global flows of information.   
Furthermore, Giddens acknowledges that routine, social praxis stabilizes trust.  
He notes that everyday, practical action overshadows modern uncertainties that would 
otherwise threaten ontological security (1991a).  We may question, however, if Giddens 
wrongly conflates the presence of trust with the taken-for-granted character of ordinary 
praxis.  I contend that the organism may demonstrate a “tacit acceptance” of abstract 
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systems that are relatively hostile toward her experiential being.  Moreover, she—despite 
the experiential violence she endures—may navigate these systems with relative 
competence. Giddens, at least implicitly, acknowledges this as well.  Discussing the 
modern individual’s experience with intractable, macro-systemic risks, he suggests that 
said individual demonstrates a secular sense of fate, “…a feeling that things will take 
their own course…” (1991b: 133).  This sense of fate, Giddens notes, counteracts 
existential anxiety and subsequent inertia.   
But what happens to those individuals who are unable to sustain a sense of fate 
and concomitant trust?  Are they necessarily without psychical recourse?  Before 
answering these questions, we should recognize that praxeological competence does not 
have to coincide with existential confidence—a circumstance I refer to as primary 
mistrust.  With that said, Niklas Luhmann (1979) notes that distrust (what I would 
describe as secondary mistrust) is functionally similar to trust.  Like trust it reduces the 
complexity of situational meaning.  Likewise, I contend that primary mistrust is 
functionally similar to (and likely oscillates with) primary trust.  It enables the organism 
to navigate her environment without traumatic harm.  However, mistrust does not protect 
her from a (perhaps unconscious) sense of danger.   
We may categorize the disposition of confidence without competence as well.  
To articulate the secondary character of this circumstance, we may adopt the layman’s 
understanding, which identifies such a disposition as arrogance—i.e., one exaggerates 
or lies about her abilities.  We may identify the primary character of this disposition as 
delusion—i.e., one genuinely feels, despite evidence to the contrary, that she holds such 
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competence.  Together, however, praxeological competence and existential confidence 
represent the development and maintenance of a meaningful integration between one’s 
affective constitution and the world that confronts her.  To fully understand this, we 
must return our discussion to Loewald’s structural theory of mind.    
 
The Ego’s Oscillatory Praxis  
Loewald (1988) argues that the instinctual-affective will of the primary process 
oscillates with, rather than inhibits, the higher ordered mentation of the secondary 
process.  This relationship is such that both instinctual energy and environmental 
structure facilitate, rather than impinge upon, an agentic ego.  With that said, Loewald 
(1973a) criticizes the early psychoanalytic view for portraying psychic operations as first 
and foremost eschewing undesirable or harmful stimuli.  Noting the work of Anna 
Freud, he acknowledges that much of psychic activity results in growth, not stagnation.  
Loewald explains, “Defense would be the ego’s projection of its own status quo, 
whereas internalization would involve expansion, further and richer organization of the 
ego” (176).  The ego Loewald presents us with, then, is an active one.  He holds that it 
interacts with, extends into and becomes a part of the environment.   
To understand this dynamic integration, however, we must acknowledge that the 
ego is first and foremost an organizing agency.  Loewald notes that Heinz Hartman’s 
conceptual distinction of the ego as a “substructure” of the mind and not as the whole 
personality drew theoretical attention to the ego’s differentiating function.  He explains 
that this distinction places greater emphasis on the idea that prior to her development of 
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“…identification and boundary-setting interactions…” (174)—the primary narcissistic 
phase—the organism does not experience her corporal self as a distinct object, as 
separate from the environment.  This undifferentiated, global experience reflects 
instinctual-affective expression in its irreducible form.  
 Primary process mentation, then, is the process of dedifferentiation: a psychical 
move away from higher level mentation toward an undifferentiated will.  In 
contradistinction to primary mentation, ego and superego represent higher ordered 
mental functions, which Loewald (1978b; 1988) describes as the psychic internalization 
and subsequent differentiation of extrapsychic objects and processes.  Nevertheless, the 
primary process id remains an integral part of, despite being structurally different from, 
these secondary functions.  Such a stipulation, though, requires a thorough examination 
of how Loewald (re)conceptualizes the instincts. 
 
The Instincts as “The Life of the Body” 
Out of all of his psychoanalytic writings, Loewald’s (1971a; 1973b; 1978a) articulation 
of the instinctual is perhaps the most complex and least definitive.  A reader may easily 
interpret Loewald’s drawn-out, perhaps we should even say turgid, discussion on the 
matter as equivocal.  His apparent lack of clarity, however, is due to his attempt to sift 
through and reconstruct Freud’s muddled ideas on the subject, while simultaneously 
attempting to give breath to his own insights.   
Freud defined the instincts as psychic representations of biological stimuli.  
Despite this, he would often treat the instincts as if they were their physiological 
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counterparts (Loewald 1978a).  Loewald, unlike Freud, remains resolute in his 
definition.  He defines the instinct as “…a psychic representative of biological stimuli or 
processes, and not as these biological stimuli themselves” (208).  With that said, 
Loewald (1971a) still regards embodied processes as having pinnacle importance to the 
instinctual realm.  He asserts that the instincts and “the life of the body” are conceptually 
indistinguishable and elaborates, 
The life of the body, of bodily needs and habits and functions, kisses and 
excrements and intercourse, tastes and smells and sights, body noises and 
sensations, caresses and punishments, tics and gait and movements,… pain and 
pleasure, physical excitements and lassitude, violence and bliss—all this is the 
body in the context of human life. The body is not primarily the organism with 
its organs and physiological functions, anatomical structures, nerve pathways, 
and chemical processes. (125)   
 
What Loewald implies here is that we should understand the body and its concomitant 
affects—characterized by experiential lulls, hyperboles, punctuations and the like—in 
the language of lived experience, not physiological jargon.  Such an understanding is 
consonant with Bruno Latour’s (2004) discussion of embodiment.  Latour states, “The 
body is… not a provisional residence of something superior—an immortal soul, the 
universal or thought—but what leaves a dynamic trajectory by which we learn to register 
and become sensitive to what the world is made of” (206).  To articulate the body as a 
jumble of component parts, then, circumvents the rich meaning we may derive from 
delineating the body as that which is informed by and informs context, as an experiential 
means to subjectivity.  Accordingly, to speak of the instincts is to speak of the body’s 
contextual limits and potential. 
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 Latour touches upon such concerns when he contends that the body serves as 
“…an interface that becomes more and more describable as it learns to be affected by 
more and more elements” (206).  This definition resonates with Loewald’s 
conceptualization of the psyche.  Such a psyche, Loewald (1973a; 1988) tells us, 
facilitates greater experiential understanding as it incorporates and differentiates more 
objects.  If we disregard Loewald’s reliance upon a Cartesian dualism then we may come 
to recognize that the two definitions are one and the same.  Returning to the theory of the 
mind, we might say that as the organism undertakes secondary process mentation, she 
develops a new way to experience, a new bodied awareness; increasing differentiation of 
self and the world of objects characterizes such an experience.  With her new awareness 
(or rather her new way of being aware), she obfuscates, but does not relinquish, the prior 
one: an undifferentiated, instinctual awareness (i.e., an awareness articulated by the 
primary process will).   
Before we accept these claims, however, we must acknowledge that Loewald 
(1971a) obstinately, and somewhat paradoxically, contends that the body must remain 
conceptually distinct from the psyche.  He explains that this division is necessary for 
maintaining psychology (and therefore psychoanalysis) as a distinct discipline.  I believe 
my discussion thus far demonstrates that I have no intention to maintain the integrity of a 
stand alone discourse.  The idea that an experiential being does not have a body, but 
rather is a body, grounds my present theoretical efforts.  Hence, I adopt a lexically 
unbound, relational perspective that treats mind, body and environment as co-constituted 
entities (see Blackman and Venn 2010).   
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Loewald’s idea that instinctual energy constitutes the psyche seems well suited 
for such a perspective.  Loewald states:  
In contradistinction to Freud’s thought…, I do not speak of biological stimuli 
impinging on a ready made ‘psychic apparatus’ in which their psychic 
representatives are thus created, but of interactional biological processes that find 
higher organization on levels which we have come to call psychic life. (1978a: 
208)   
 
The instincts with which we are left, then, enable psychic functioning—specifically the 
higher ordered ego and superego.  Loewald explains, “…the original wholeness [of the 
primary process] is kept alive by an articulating integration that makes a textured totality 
out of a global one. What was homogeneous becomes a manifold whose elements are 
linked together” (196).  By way of analogy we may compare Loewald’s model of 
psychic development to the act of sculpting clay.  By giving the clay form, the sculptor 
transforms the clay into art.  With said transformation, the clay—or rather its 
relationship to the world—receives new (secondary) complexity and meaning.  
However, if the properties of clay were to breakdown, the sculpture would crumble.  
Clay, like the instincts, maintains a specific quality prior to and after receiving artistic 
form.  Like the irreducible properties of clay, we may acknowledge that the synchronic 
id—the global, undifferentiated will— maintains a presence within the diachronic 
superego—the fluctuating, sociocultural texture of affective energy.  Secondary process, 
then, is an experiential texture that continually emerges, but never becomes distinct, 
from the primary process (with which it will continue to oscillate).   
Furthermore, superego organization reflects the integration between an 
organism’s embodied experience and the sociocultural structure she enacts.  As 
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suggested previously, this integration occurs through the process of object incorporation 
(perhaps for our sociological purposes we should say pattern incorporation) and 
psychical differentiation.  The psyche’s incorporation of any given structure is 
functional, then, if it enables the organism to adapt to and integrate with the environment 
in a way that does not cause her experiential harm.  Addressing the same process from a 
different conceptual angle, we may say that social praxis (which facilitates 
incorporation) is sublimatory if it constitutes the intelligible expression of cultural form 
without committing violence against “the life of the body.”  Only when the organism 
achieves sublimation (when her enactment of sociocultural form lends satisfactory 
expression to her embodied experience) may we regard the structural features of the 
environment as agentic.   
The organism, as we now know, accomplishes this through the formation of a 
superego.  This resonates with Loewald’s (1988) stipulation that both ego and superego 
are forms of sublimation.  In service to the id (and the organism), they provide organized 
channels of affective expression (and therefore assuage and circumvent experiential 
violence).  Yet, scholars typically do not discuss or emphasize the superego’s 
sublimatory role.  This is likely because Freud (1923; 1931) and his followers regarded 
moral prohibition as the superego’s primary function.  In so doing, they fail to 
acknowledge that the development of a morality system does not in and of itself fulfill 
an organismic need.  What, then, is the function of a moralizing agency?  To be clear, I 
am not questioning the function of a morality system independent from the embodied 
psyche.  Some scholars may find this question interesting, but it is not relevant to my 
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present concerns.  What I seek to explain is the organismic function of a psychically 
embedded morality.  Why would the organism need this apparatus?  
Simply looking to Freud’s (1931) thesis in Civilization and its Discontents, we 
recognize that the organism’s psychic incorporation of sociocultural principles will 
necessarily operate as a process of self-harm.  In other words, the moral prohibitions of a 
culture will have what is an ostensibly pathological quality since they inhibit satisfactory 
expression of the organism’s instinctual drive.  But this idea downplays culture’s 
enabling, sublimation-inducing features.  Because the organism psychically incorporates 
cultural virtues, norms, mores and taboos, she is able to adapt to and integrate with her 
environment in a way that facilitates symbolic-affective expression and understanding in 
interaction.   
This postulate lends new meaning to Freud’s thesis.  The seemingly inevitable 
discontent that pervades modern civilization may be an indication of the organism’s 
inability to wholly adapt to and integrate with her environment.  Sociocultural structures 
do not or cannot accommodate the irreducible character of “the life of the body” (i.e., 
the without structure id).  Also, the environment is necessarily dynamic and to some 
extent unpredictable; consequently, embodiment and sociocultural praxis will 
periodically misalign.  Such an experience elicits a primary process response.  The 
undifferentiated organization of instinctual-affective energy draws all of the organism’s 
embodied attention to a unitary mode of experience.  This unitary experience may be one 
of intense passion, joy or a number of other affective dispositions.  But in the 
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circumstance of misalignment, the affective message is usually a warning and will 
constitute a form of anxiety.   
The ego’s work, then, is never done. As a structuring, adaptive agency, the ego 
works to continually restructure an existing structure, the structured superego.  In 
restructuring, the ego dedifferentiates—brings the psyche closer to the primary process 
will—and, subsequently, (re)differentiates—internalizes the structures that will facilitate 
a new psychic stability.  In so doing, the ego restores primary trust.  We should not, 
however, confuse stability with stasis.  The superego must maintain a certain level of 
dynamism to remain integrated with a dynamic environment.  Whatever level of 
integration the organism achieves, her superego organization remains susceptible to 
rupture and she to traumatization.   
 
The Traumatic Experience  
Although there are some noteworthy, sociological works on psychic trauma (e.g., 
Alexander et al. 2004; Prager 2003; 2008), current sociology largely lacks a substantive 
discourse on the topic.  The psychoanalytic discussions of trauma, however, are plentiful 
and nuanced.  Since Freud’s seminal theory of seduction, the trauma concept has 
undergone a number of revisions (Bacciagaluppi 2011), but these revisions (on the 
whole) have not given way to conceptual clarity and general understanding (Smelser 
2004).  Henry Krystal (1978) suggests that one such confusion likely arises from Freud’s 
development of two ostensibly separate conceptions of trauma: the traumatic state and 
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pathogenesis.  The former refers to the experience of an unbearable situation and the 
latter to the accumulation of unacceptable impulses.   
Krystal also notes that Freud and Josef Breuer attempted to reconcile the two 
understandings with the conceptual use of partial trauma, an economic articulation of the 
stimulus-affective response to traumatic breaches. The argument being that partial 
traumas accumulate until they produce a traumatic effect.  The problem with said 
metaphor, however, is that it demonstrates a strong potential for reification.  
Conceptually, the process of pathogenesis may become an additive one in which the 
accumulated transgression of an objective threshold represents the pure standard for the 
traumatic state or experience.  Whereas such a conceptualization may be theoretically 
cogent, we must acknowledge, as John Dewey (1896) notes, that there is no essential 
break or boundary that separates the psychological stimulus from its response.   
Speaking pragmatically, I contend that traumatization may be without a clear 
beginning and end; wherefore, we should avoid locating the traumatic within a specific 
event or series of events.  To accomplish this, we may regard the traumatic as an ideal 
type.  The use of an ideal typical construct illuminates, rather than models, the empirical; 
it provides a conceptual reference point against which we may evaluate to what extent 
the functional consequences of a particular experience approach (rather than achieve) 
the traumatic.   
Such an articulation of trauma is ancillary to, yet qualitatively different from, the 
concepts strain trauma (Kris 1956) and cumulative trauma (Khan 1963).  Whereas the 
present conceptualization permits a concern for the incremental weakening of the ego 
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over time, it also suggests that every protracted strain and situational breach 
experientially points to total ego incapacitation and concomitant consequences. This idea 
fits well within a Loewaldian discourse.  Loewald, after all, emphasizes the ego’s 
organizational and integrative functions.  He states, “‘Traumatic,’ then, is any experience 
with which the immature ego is yet unable to cope by abreaction or associative 
absorption… and an experience that would need such an ego response for an adequate 
discharge of the amount of excitation involved” (1953: 37).  Loewald’s conceptual use 
of “immature” here does not necessarily mean “underdeveloped.”  He explains that an 
“immature” ego can also be the consequence of a psychical regression following a 
debilitating experience.  Because an immature ego cannot achieve adequate abreaction 
and associative absorption, the potential for experiential violence is high.   
Hence, the precise socio-analytic meaning I give to the ideal typical conception 
of trauma is the incapacitation of the organism’s ego functions—i.e., the inability to 
incorporate and organize extrapsychic contents and subsequently adapt to and integrate 
with an environment.  Looking to the empirical world, we will not find this exact 
disposition in any one living, cognizant individual.  As I have already implied, my focus 
here has less to do with the experience of a traumatic event or the hysterical aftereffects 
of said event, and more to do with how the organism manages the potential for and her 
anticipation of the traumatic.  I argue that she will continually confront and attempt to 
mitigate annihilation anxiety (Hurvich 2003).  Her development of primary trust stands 
as the ideal means by which she may cope with said anxiety.   
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With that said, the potential for trauma is an implicit concern within many 
sociological discussions of trust.  There is good reason for this.  Theories of trust 
typically demonstrate a Durkheimian sensibility.  Emile Durkheim (1893; 1912) sought 
to explicate the processes of social integration and structural functionality.  In such a 
discourse the traumatic tends to become secondary, but it need not be.10  As I will 
explain, sublimated trust—in addition to being foundational to social action—is 
foundational to the organism’s basic sense of well being.  Just as sociologists recognize 
that the organism’s shared, phenomenological reality is fragile, so too is her sense of 
confidence and security in an environment.  Consequently, the traumatic lurks just 
beneath the surface of an ostensibly sturdy, social veneer.  The organism’s persistent 
anticipation of these events—the enduring angst of an undeniable vulnerability—
requires that she maneuver through the everyday encounter with care.   
We must keep in mind, then, that the organism does not (in day-to-day praxis) 
experience an anticipation of trauma as traumatic; rather, said experience may take on 
an unsettling or uncanny presence.11  The organism is periodically, but not chronically, 
ill at ease.  This experience is visceral, but not necessarily conscious (in the cognitive 
sense); it is experientially inchoate.  However, if in ordinary, everyday praxis the 
organism successfully maintains primary trust, then the persistent potential for trauma 
will not likely result in symptom formation (e.g., maladaptive neuroses). 
 
                                                 
10 Although we should also recognize that Durkheim conceived of anomie, which reflects a traumatic 
disposition.   
11 Yet we should also acknowledge that the experience of anticipation alone can traumatize the organism.   
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Potential Trauma and Strategic Action  
Concepts like trauma and ordinary praxis are ostensibly the unlikeliest of bedfellows.  
Erving Goffman (1959) and Harold Garfinkel (1967), however, challenge the layman’s 
conflation of the ordinary and the insignificant.  Their theoretical works demonstrate an 
implicit concern for the traumatic in normal, everyday interaction.  To understand this 
we must first acknowledge that these authors regard the violation to the organism’s 
expectations as a rupture to her sense of reality.  Garfinkel illustrates such an occurrence 
when he instructed his students to “breach” the socially constructed realities of their 
friends and families.  He notes that many of the provoked reactions were emotionally 
intense and defensive in character.  Presently, we may interpret the breached individual’s 
defensiveness as an indication of her efforts to protect and maintain a sense of 
confidence and competence, her sense of primary trust.   
The breach challenges the integrity of trust by undermining what Jeffrey Prager 
describes as, “The continued availability of fantasies of one’s aliveness, wellness, and a 
more-or-less sense of one’s own omnipotence and capacity for spontaneity, accompanied 
with a not-too-persecutory other…” (2011: 444).  I contend that these fantasies 
comprise, in part, the structured superego.  Such fantasies do not necessarily represent a 
form of psychic disavowal; rather, they emerge from and are ancillary to the 
intersubjective context of social praxis (Chodorow 1999).  This stipulation parallels 
Goffman’s emphasis on the fictional quality of shared meaning.  For example, Goffman 
states:  
… [T]he world tends to be bathed in better images than anyone deserves, for it is 
practical to signify great appreciation of others by offering them deferential 
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indulgences, knowing that some of these indulgences will be declined as an 
expression of good demeanor. (1956: 492) 
 
We may interpret this passage as an illustration of how the participants within an 
interaction order may create and sustain shared fantasies as part of the normative 
infrastructure.  The ostensibly ordinary, social niceties of this infrastructure facilitate a 
narcissistic distance from an otherwise uncaring world.   
We may also note that shared fantasies protect the “sacred” character of social 
existence.  Goffman implies such when he suggests that the seemingly irreligious, 
modern world constitutes a great deal of ritual interaction oriented toward the sacred 
management of one’s face—i.e., “ …an image of self delineated in terms of approved 
social attributes…” (1955: 213).  He further contends that the loss or disparagement of 
face, a violation to the sacred, elicits embarrassment, shame and uneasiness.  Looking to 
the literature, we recognize that embarrassment and shame may demonstrate a 
relationship with trauma.  Thomas J. Scheff (2003) indicates such with the suggestion 
that shame signals a threat to the social bond.  Bessel A. van der Kolk (1987) completes 
the theoretical connection with the contention that an organism will likely experience a 
rupture to her social bonds as traumatic.  Moreover, Dianne Trumbull (2008) contends 
that humiliation is a traumatic stimulus that threatens the organism’s narcissistic 
integrity.  She conjectures that the defensive posture provoked by humiliation is a 
survival mechanism inherent to the organism’s evolutionary development.   
Such a claim, perhaps to the surprise of many sociologists, resonates well with 
Goffman’s theory of interaction.  Although he does not speak of evolution and human 
nature, Goffman (1983) unequivocally acknowledges that his theories to pertain to 
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interaction orders across time and space.  Whereas we recognize that the rituals for 
coping with and avoiding embarrassment differ from one culture to the next, we may 
acknowledge that a ritualistic handling of embarrassment is ubiquitous.  We also note 
that if embarrassment and humiliation are not the same, they are at least very similar (the 
difference being that of intensity).  The underlying point of these connections is that 
embarrassment, humiliation, shame and similar affects serve as affective signals, which 
unconsciously indicate the nearing presence of traumatization.12   
I have noted that Goffman does not discuss trauma specifically, but he does 
painstakingly demonstrate the inherent vulnerability of the actor’s perceived reality.  
With the whole of her phenomenological world at stake, the actor does not have a 
narcissistic interest in maintaining her face alone; she also works to maintain the faces of 
others (Goffman 1956).  Goffman emphasizes how this responsibility supports a 
symbolic order.  I, however, wish to draw attention to an experiential one.  The idea that 
actors negotiate and affirm situational definitions through symbolic interaction does not 
imply that the symbolic and the affective are mutually exclusive.  Symbolic interaction 
is concomitant with embodied projection and introjection.   
Arlie Russell Hochschild’s (1979; 1983) investigations of emotion work supports 
this stipulation.  She argues that actors employ deep acting, which refers to the effort to 
make personal feelings consistent with a situational frame.  Emotion work of this kind, 
Hochschild (1979) argues, becomes manifest through the gesture; the present discussion 
regards such a gesture as part and parcel of the ego function.  The ego, then, does not 
                                                 
12 We should also acknowledge that such affective experiences can, in and of themselves, be traumatizing.   
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simply organize and protect a personality system; it organizes and protects the whole of 
an intersubjective universe—which includes self, other and context.  Ergo, the ego also 
engages the social realm.   
Goffman’s notion of poise is an exemplarily illustration of such engagement.  
From a dramaturgical perspective, poise is the ability to maintain composure despite a 
threat to one’s face.  Goffman explains, “…to appear flustered… is considered evidence 
of weakness, inferiority, low status, moral guilt, defeat, and other un-enviable attributes” 
(1956: 266).  In the context of the present discussion, then, the practice of poise prevents 
the situational gaffe from becoming a significant fracture in the intersubjective 
foundation of shared experience.  Hence, I interpret poise as process in which one 
demonstrates praxeological competence despite momentary or periodic insecurity.  The 
psyche will internalize competent performances, which thereupon serve as a form of 
personal confidence.  Wherefore, we will likely find that that the successful maintenance 
of primary trust often coincides with an ability to demonstrate poise.   
Furthermore, poise is a collective (but not necessarily communal) responsibility.  
Goffman explains, “Resolution of… [a desecrated] situation to everyone’s apparent 
satisfaction is the first [moral] requirement; correct apportionment of blame is typically a 
secondary consideration” (223).  In contributing to situational repair, then, the ego 
assists and is assisted by others.  Likewise, the psyche’s maintenance of experiential 
meaning necessitates that it remain receptive to interpolation. Goffman iterates, “A 
social relationship… can be seen as a way in which the person is more than ordinarily 
forced to trust… [her] face to the tact and good conduct of others” (1955: 230). 
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Compulsory (or secondary) trust, as we now know, entails risk.  If the organism’s 
expectations of a particular person or institution are not met, if her secondary trust is 
violated, she may lose a general (primary) sense of confidence in social living.  
Returning to Goffman’s emphasis on the need for resolution, we may recognize that 
more than one’s face is at stake in ordinary interaction.  
Loewald, too, places significant emphasis on resolution.  He asserts that the need 
for atonement maintains a presence throughout the life-course.  In making this argument, 
Loewald departs from Freud’s centralization of the Oedipus complex.  He suggests that 
prior to and at the heart of the oedipal tension is “a psychotic core, related to the earliest 
vicissitudes of the ambivalent search for primary narcissistic unity and individuation…” 
(1979: 403 emphasis added).  Nevertheless, Loewald retains an emphasis on the 
developmental significance of oedipal conflict.  He states:  
…[N]o matter how resolutely the ego turns away from it and what the relative 
proportions of repression, sublimation, ‘destruction’ might be, in adolescence the 
Oedipus complex rears its head again, and so it does during later periods in life, 
in normal people as well as in neurotics. (386)    
 
As such, Loewald places greater emphasis than Freud on the organism’s inability to fully 
relinquish oedipal object ties.  Because the primal tension never achieves full resolution, 
this struggle persists throughout the life-course.  Extrapolating from Loewald’s model of 
development, I hold that oedipal struggles also occur within and throughout ordinary, 
everyday interaction.  But before we can make the conceptual leap from a model of 
psychic development to a theory of social praxis, we must also note that Loewald further 
departs from Freud by suggesting that the Oedipus complex represents a psychic 
parricide.   
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Referencing the Webster dictionary, Loewald defines parricide as follows: “One 
who murders a person to whom he stands in a specially sacred relation, as a father, 
mother, or other near relative, or (in a wider sense) a ruler….” (Webster, 2nd ed. cited by 
Loewald 1979: 387).  Adopting Goffman’s Durkheimian sensibility in which the social 
constitutes a sacred realm, we may note that Loewald’s delineation of the Oedipus 
complex enables us to move beyond a specific struggle with the father to a struggle with 
“significant” or “sacred” others, even if these others are institutions or collective 
representations.  For, as Loewald elaborates, Oedipal strivings also represent the 
desecration of a parental substitute—i.e., that which resembles “…the bringing forth, 
nourishing, providing for, and protecting of the child by the parents that constitute 
their parenthood and ‘authority’ (authorship)…” (387).  One fundamental reason for 
why this consecratory condensation may occur is that particular, intimate others are the 
agents of socialization; wherefore, the organism internalizes normative rules and 
obligations as an extension of these others.   
Furthermore, the parricide metaphor does not imply an abandonment of sacred 
ties; rather, it suggests a transformation of these ties.  Loewald explains, 
In an important sense, by evolving our own autonomy, our own superego, and by 
engaging in nonincestuous object relations, we are killing our parents. We are 
usurping their power, their competence, their responsibility for us, and we are 
abnegating, rejecting them as libidinal objects. In short, we destroy them in 
regard to some of their qualities hitherto most vital to us. Parents resist as well as 
promote such destruction no less ambivalently than children carry it out. (390) 
 
What we have then is a process of destruction or turbulence (parricide) that facilitates 
adaptation and growth (integration and reorganization of oedipal sentiments).  What we 
can take from this is that the internalization of any given structure (in this case a parental 
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figure) may entail a degree of autonomy from said structure.  Accordingly, the 
integration between embodied psyche and social world does not necessitate the 
organism’s subservience to convention; rather, the organism’s ability (or inability) to 
navigate the dynamic, sociocultural environment as a competent, autonomous being 
demonstrates the integrity of such integration.  Any psyche-environment concordance 
that an organism achieves, however, requires periodic repair.    
I have noted that Goffman’s notion of symbolic repair parallels Loewald’s 
concept of atonement.  Both ideas posit a particular emotion as central to the reparation 
process.  Goffman contends that embarrassment is the primary emotion propelling the 
actor toward reconciliation; Loewald (1979), however, follows Freud in positioning guilt 
within this primary role.  Though this difference may seem to represent a significant 
contradiction between the two perspectives, we should acknowledge that the perceived 
significance of an affect is dependent upon which particular facet of the organism-
environment relationship is under investigation.  Everyday, social interaction and the 
development of the psyche throughout the life course are two distinctly different facets 
of this relationship.  Yet we may synthesize these efforts to investigate the reparation of 
primary trust and the circumvention of the traumatic—processes that concern both 
immediate and long term interactions.   
To better understand the reconciliation process, we may look to how Loewald 
delineates the child’s resolution of parricidal guilt.  He explains, “What will be left 
if things go well is tenderness, mutual trust, and respect—the signs of equality” (390).  
For our present, sociological purposes we may redefine these relational endowments as 
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empathy, sublimated trust, and cooperation—the constituents of agentic growth.  But we 
cannot assume that the organism will necessarily achieve reintegration.  Loewald 
elaborates, “To the extent to which patients and others insist on cruel, inflexible 
standards and demands and persist in unconsciously dealing with love objects as 
incestuous objects, they fight against bearing and mastering the guilt of parricide by 
internalizing atonement” (389).  Keeping in mind Loewald’s revision of the Oedipus 
complex, we should recognize that the conceptual use of incest here takes on new 
meaning.  Instead of implying sexual desire, incestuous refers to an emotionally stunted 
reliance that encumbers the organism’s opportunity for agentic growth.  To have an 
incestuous relationship is to demonstrate a psychical inability to relinquish outmoded 
structural arrangements or object ties.    
Incorporating this theoretical scaffolding into a dramaturgical13 analysis, I 
contend that an organism that bears but does not master famacide (the destruction of her 
face or reputation) develops incestuous social relations or identity claims.  In this 
circumstance, the organism unconsciously relies upon social affirmation that is no longer 
available to her.  If she is unable to master a violation to her experiential connection to a 
sociocultural environment, she unconsciously retains a reliance on what was a familiar, 
trusted mode of being in the world—a mode (or psychical organization) that no longer 
finds intelligible expression outside of experiential disavowal.   
                                                 
13 Dramaturgy is method of  theoretical analysis in which the investigator articulates social interaction with 
theatrical or performance metaphors.   
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Loewald continues, “Need for punishment tends to become inexhaustible if 
atonement, reconciliation, is not eventually brought about by mourning which leads to a 
mature superego and to the possibility of nonincestuous object relations…” (389-390).  
We should not, regarding it and incestuous as a binary opposition, take “nonincestuous” 
to simply mean a relative independence from particular objects or structures. Loewald 
explains, “…the word ‘atone,’ literally and in many contexts, means… to bring to 
concord or harmony” (390).  Accordingly, nonincestuous refers to harmonious structural 
or object relations; with said harmony comes growth and efficacy.   
In the case of famicide, the organism must mourn and abreact the death of her 
face if she is to renegotiate and reclaim a new identity.  What this means is that the 
psyche, and therefore the organism, is not inherently agentic.14  The organism achieves 
agency through the process of working through.  If she is unable to accomplish this—
i.e., if she cannot renegotiate her identity claims—self-loathing and other forms of self-
punishment will pervade her everyday praxis.  Why, though, would there be a persistent 
call to action, the heed to self-punish?  
The answer, following the logic of the discussion thus far, should be obvious; 
punishment is an attempt at mastery, a compromised abreaction.  Loewald lends 
credence to this claim when he states, “Punishment is sought to evade or undo guilt” 
(390-391).  It would be a mistake, then, to regard self-punishment as ineffective or 
irrational. The effectiveness and rationality of such action is relative to the alternatives at 
                                                 
14 Although we could complicate this stipulation by acknowledging that part and parcel of the organism’s 
affective constitution is a will which enables her persevere.   
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the organism’s disposal.  If the organism is unable to achieve atonement and subsequent 
reconciliation, self-punishments fend off (at least temporarily) an otherwise 
insurmountable engulfment by negative affects. Although, we should note that 
Loewald—referring to it as a “short circuit”—insinuates that self-punishment is a 
counterproductive alternative to more appropriate action.  
Outside of the therapeutic holding environment, however, the structural 
arrangements of a specific sociocultural milieu may be such that the organism—despite 
her better efforts—cannot engage a more appropriate praxis.  In this circumstance, the 
existing sociocultural structures hinder, rather than facilitate, agency.  This stipulation 
does not imply that the organism is entirely without self-efficacy.  She is resourceful and 
uses those limited means at her disposal to take responsibility for her plight.  Although 
the propensity to self-punish emanates from a faulty personality or psychical 
constitution, it originates with an agentic choice (among limited choices) and thereupon 
develops into habit. The initial compulsion is to action, not a specific action.  The same 
holds for other pathological dispositions, such as obsession and delusion.  Despite their 
destructive consequences, these practices are agentic attempts at mastery.  In a far from 
perfect environment, they are the organism’s (perhaps feeble) attempts at adaptation and 
integration.   
With that said, we cannot, following Herbert Marcuse (1964), depict the 
organism who adopts the pathological praxes of her environment as a cultural dope—
i.e., a “one dimensional,” “happy conscious,” automaton who readily resigns herself to 
exploitation and manipulation.  This is not to suggest that the organism is invulnerable to 
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political and cultural seduction.  However, when critically evaluating the sociocultural 
structures of a particular environment, we should not confuse her coping for 
complacency.  We should also recognize that psychic struggle, torment, and resilience 
lurk just beneath an ostensible acquiescence.    
Perhaps this is one reason why both Freud and Goffman delineate theories with a 
defensive or confrontational bias.  The empirical circumstances from which they largely 
developed their respective ideas are exemplary of social environments that cannot 
facilitate a sublimated integration of embodied praxis.  Using Loewaldian language, we 
would say that the psyche’s primary-secondary process oscillation is not harmonious; the 
life of the body and sociocultural form are either not integrating well or an established 
integration is deteriorating. This discordance may elicit the pervasive sense of guilt 
articulated by Freud and Loewald or the embarrassment and shame articulated by 
Goffman.  In either case, we may acknowledge that the secondary process organization 
of the superego pushes the primary process will beyond its means of plasticity—i.e., 
beyond its irreducible quality, the primary process id.  As such, both guilt and 
embarrassment (and all negative affects for that matter) give experiential salience to the 
potential for trauma.  The drive for reconciliation (or Eros) elicits the ego’s defensive 
and adaptive processes to circumvent a potentially traumatic experience.  Still, if the ego 
fails to achieve a working “integration,” trauma will likely ensue. 
Hereafter, however, we need not centralize the unresolved oedipal struggle as the 
source of the traumatic.  Although Loewald posits that oedipal tension continues 
throughout the life-course, the concept—at least for the context of the present argument 
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—is too allied with a theory of psychical development.  Because our present concern is 
with a fundamental mode of being in the world, we shall return to that which is 
fundamental to the Oedipus complex: the obfuscated, yet continually present, psychotic 
core.  It is here, at the psychotic core, that the psyche faces the hazard of fragmentation.  
We could say that the psychotic core serves as an affective incandescence within the 
organism-environment dyad, periodically revealing the inherent vulnerability of the 
relationship.  If we accept this claim, we should also accept the idea that the potential for 
trauma maintains a presence within everyday life.  This is not to suggest that the 
potential for trauma is necessarily a salient feature of the ordinary circumstance; 
however, salience, we must remember, is not a synonym for significance.  As 
psychoanalysts and toxicologists are well aware, the subtle can be quite powerful and 
even a diluted poison can have profound effects.  
In summation, then, we may acknowledge that the psychotic core and its oedipal 
predecessor reveal an enduring discordance between the organism and her environment.  
We also recognize that their resolution or reconciliation determines the structural quality 
of the superego.  For our sociological purposes, we may regard the structured superego 
as the internalization and impermanent solidification of environmental circumstance.  It 
constitutes a working awareness—not just cognitively, but also somatically—that the 
organism employs to navigate her experiences in the world.  On that note, we may 
acknowledge that my conceptual alteration of the superego function does not negate its 
traditional, moralizing function. 
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The Management of Trust and Trauma in Everyday Life  
Trust enables the organism to undertake complex interaction and, in so doing, 
perpetuates the structure of social praxis.  This is in part because trust mitigates the 
anxiety elicited by looming uncertainty.  To trust, then, is to expect particular 
experiences or anticipate future events (Luhmann 1979; Sztompka 1999).  This 
stipulation is compatible with Loewald’s (1962) claim that superego activity 
demonstrates a future orientation.  He describes this orientation as a process in which the 
primary process wish for omnipotent perfection transforms into a psychical temporality, 
“the ego’s futurity” (51).  The superego comes to represent that which is and will be, 
plus that which is not yet, but can or should be.  This process occurs through a, 
“…magical [or fantasized] communion with an ideal authority…” (47)—that which one 
wishes to become.  Adapting these claims to our present needs, we may regard this 
communion as the process in which an organism participates in collective fantasy work 
and, in so doing, psychically incorporates cultural ideals or sensibilities.  If all goes well, 
she is able to anticipate a communal future.  If this future is one of security (or is at least 
not characterized by danger), her competence will generate confidence and her 
experience will be one of primary trust.     
As I have noted, however, such trust is on a continuum with trauma.  The 
organism’s everyday interactions bring her closer to one end or the other.  On one end of 
the continuum she has a unified, structured psyche; on the other end her psyche is 
fractured.  With that said, approaching primary trust does not free the organism from the 
hazard of traumatization.  It may even increase the likelihood of such an occurrence.  
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After all, one without trust has less to lose than one with trust (Brothers 2007).  The 
advantage of trust is that it enables the organism to mitigate and temporarily circumvent 
annihilation anxiety.  Still, trust cannot reduce the inherent vulnerability of interaction.  
Goffman explains that in interaction everyone is, “…a potential victim or 
aggressor …” (1963, 196).  Although such harm may elude conscious, analytical 
understanding, it maintains an experiential presence.  Insinuating a similar idea, 
Goffman states: 
And it is through body signs that persons present signify to each other that they 
can be trusted not to exploit these threatening possibilities. Only when these 
signs are received may the individual feel secure enough to forget about 
defending … [herself], secure enough to give …[herself] up to the merely-
situated aspects of …[her] involvements. (197) 
  
We may acknowledge the smile, the relaxed posture, the gentle, unobtrusive gaze, etc. as 
examples of said signs.15  The organism experiences the successful reception of and 
response to these sings as an indication that her symbolic-affective intelligibility in the 
present moment facilitates contextually competent understanding and action.   
As ritual demeanors within ritual circumstances, these sociocultural 
arrangements lend themselves to psychic incorporation, becoming part of the structured 
superego.  Ritual praxis, then, facilitates abreaction and associative absorption.  Loewald 
supports this claim when he states: 
The distinction of reproductive and recreative repetition can be applied to the 
concepts of primary and secondary process and can help elucidate the relations 
                                                 
15 We may also acknowledge that Baudrillard’s illustration of the fake smile complicates this thesis.  He 
states, “Smile and others will smile back.  Smile to show how transparent, how candid you are. Smile if 
you have nothing to say.  Most of all, do not hide the fact you have nothing to say nor your total 
indifference to others” (1986: 34). In a simulacra society, then, the organism may view the ostensibly kind 
gesture with suspicion.   
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between id, ego and superego….  The ego repeats, on a new level of organization 
which in our subjective experience and to our observation appears as heightened 
psychic activity as compared with the antecedent level, the processes which we 
conceptualize as id; the ego, insofar as it does not defend against them, repeats 
them in reorganizing them, i.e. recreatively.  (1971b: 62) 
 
Here, Loewald highlights that repetitions are not always pathological reactions, 
necessarily inhibiting the psyche’s higher functions.  The repetitive action, he explains, 
mitigates the presence of debilitating affect, allowing the psyche to reabsorb a troubling 
experience.  Loewald derives this idea from the therapeutic process.  He argues that 
through her transference repetitions with an analyst, the analysand lends novel meaning 
to and mastery over past and present experience. 
We need not, however, limit the discussion of transference and “working 
through” to the analyst-analysand encounter.  These processes also constitute the 
ritualistic praxes of everyday life.  By saying such, I contend that working through 
occurs outside of and prior to traumatization.  The interaction order represents repetition 
in which the organism continually works through (or manages) her inherent vulnerability 
and attendant anxiety.  Thus, the ritualistic gestures that mature into habit and, 
consequently, a habitués—such as nodding, waving, smiling and the like—facilitate the 
abreaction of an otherwise anxious inclination toward defensive maneuvering.   
Hence, a violation to ritual praxis may result in perilous consequences.  Even the 
smallest of ruptures—e.g., the lover’s gaze that is not met with reciprocal affection—
may elicit debilitating terror.  Every ordinary action, then, is actually quite extraordinary.  
The ostensibly benign may constitute a loss from which the organism cannot recover.   
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Concluding Remarks and Future Directions 
Because the present work represents an inception rather than the resolution of a theory, 
the concluding remarks will likely leave the reader with more questions than answers.  
With that said, I hope to have presented the reader with fertile ground in which to 
cultivate further theoretical and empirical insights.  I have attempted to demonstrate an 
inextricable link between the structure of the embodied psyche and that of the social 
world.  As such, the categorical distinction between natural and social being does not 
serve as a viable dichotomy for explaining human experience.   
I have also argued that the structure of social praxis is part and parcel of the ego 
function; however, we should remember, following Robert K. Merton’s (1968) 
proclamation about structural substitutes,16 that the ego is not dependent upon any 
particular social practice.  For example, the ego may fulfill the need for existential 
security through the psychical incorporation of religion, science or a number of other 
social institutions.  Part of the ego function, then, is the ability to recognize the 
usefulness of any particular structure and, therefore, permit its psychic incorporation.  
Ideally, the ego will organize and adapt the psyche in response to the changing nature of 
the sociocultural world.  If this is done in a way that permits authentic expression of both 
affective-instinctual and sociocultural praxis, then the organism may achieve a 
sublimated trust in her environment.      
                                                 
16 The concept of structural substitutes implies that there is no essential relationship between a particular 
social structure and the need it fulfills.  Accordingly, different structures may fulfill the same need.   
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To accomplish this mode of being, the ego does not content itself with 
intrapsychic alignment alone.  It also shapes extrapsychic structure in an attempt to 
achieve psyche-environment congruity.  This may be one of if not the primary 
motivation for the ego to extend beyond the confines of intrapsychic organization.  
Nowhere is this type of ego activity made more apparent than in Goffman’s theorizing 
about everyday, interaction rituals; namely, his painstaking articulation of such concepts 
as face-work, impression management, and the practice of deference and demeanor.  We 
may also add Hochschild’s idea of emotion work and deep acting to this list.  All of 
these concepts reflect the ego’s attempt to assuage environmental uncertainties, which 
would otherwise facilitate experiential violence.   
A potential problem, however, is that the ego demonstrates greater efficacy over 
intrapsychic organization than it does over the organization of the extrapsychic 
environment.  If we are true to a Loewaldian perspective then we must recognize that the 
organism, according to the Eros principle, seeks reconciliation.  Because the organism 
has little control over the environment, disjuncture between psyche and environment will 
occur.  Interaction partners may easily repair a minor disjuncture, but significant, 
persistent ones will likely result in traumatization.  Such a circumstance may, at least 
temporarily, incapacitate the ego—leaving the psyche exposed to raw, unorganized 
experience; psychical incorporation ceases and violent penetration begins.  Hence, the 
organism requires the utmost diligence from the ego.  Like the human heart that must 
remain beating from the beginning until the end of the organism’s life, the ego must 
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continue its intra- and extrapsychic organizational work until psychic functioning has 
ceased.   
Future work may investigate the premise that psychic organization is not a 
wholly defensive endeavor.  The static environment is as beneficial to the functioning of 
the psyche as a drastically changing one.  The experience of enduring stasis is the 
experience of boredom, a symptom of psychic malnourishment.  The psychic nectar and 
subsequent satisfaction that comes with stability is ephemeral; in the absence of psychic 
growth, the organism will settle for destructive aggression (Fromm 1973).   
Growth, then, demonstrates a peculiar relationship with discourses such as 
psychoanalysis and dramaturgy; traditionally, these perspectives demonstrates a 
defensive bias.  Growth suggests that an organism may seek to change her psychical 
and/or the environmental organization despite how aptly suited and, therefore, trust 
facilitating said organizations may be.  In other words, growth suggests that the 
organism is willing to endure some level of uncertainty.  Subsequent discussions may 
explore what implications this stipulation will have for the present theory of trust and 
trauma in everyday life.  Furthermore, the investigation of a sublimated praxis that 
results from the integration between an embodied subject and a sociocultural 
environment presents many intriguing avenues of exploration for a cultural sociology of 
emotion.  For example, one may investigate how the present discussion challenges or is 
challenged by other discussions surrounding sublimation, culture and embodiment, such 
as Norman O. Brown’s (1959) Life Against Death or Herbert Marcuse’s (1955) Eros and 
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Civilization.17  We may find that a thoroughly developed concept of sublimation has 
much to offer social theory in general and sociology in particular. 
Lastly, we should acknowledge that the present discussion may contribute a 
number of apt connections to a sociology of stress.  Stjepan Mestrovic and Barry  
Glassner (1983) delineate a sociology of stress in reference to Durkheim’s 
conceptualization of homo duplex.18  In so doing, they suggest that scholars need not 
depict certain life events as inherently stressful.  The stressfulness of an event, they 
argue, depends on whether or not said event facilitates (or fails to facilitate) balanced, 
social integration.  Future research may readily synthesize this idea with my present 
discussion of trauma avoidance and mitigation.  After all, stress and lack of social 
integration demonstrate a relationship to the traumatic (Mestrovic 1985).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17For example, Brown and Marcuse lend greater emphasis to the role of the libinal drives in their 
discussions of sublimation and culture.  Also, Brown and Marcuse do discuss the role trust plays in 
sublimatory processes.      
18 The idea the human nature is both instinctual and socialized. We see this dual nature thesis throughout 
Durkheim’s works, but he gives the idea direct attention in Professional Ethics and Civil Morals (1957) 
Moral Education (1925) The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (1912). 
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CHAPTER III 
EXPERIENTIAL UNDERSTANDING AND EXPERIENTIAL DISCONTINUITY  
 
The present discussion continues from a psychoanalytic understanding of subjectivity: 
the sensate body’s experience of corporeal frustration operates as a form of mentation 
which orients self to (distinguishes self from) a world of objects.  We may find the 
origins of this understanding in Sigmund Freud’s (1915; 1938) articulation of the 
process through which the neonate develops a new sense of reality.  Prior to this 
newfound awareness the organism’s experience of the world is that of primary 
narcissism, or an oceanic oneness in which there are no psychically distinct object 
relations.  Embodying the primary mode of being, the child does not yet experience 
desire because her being constitutes immediate and taken for granted satiation.  As the 
mother ensconces her with attentive handling, the neonate’s needs are met without 
disruption; wherefore, the neonate experiences satiation as the direct consequence of her 
will.   
There will be a time, however, when the mother denies or is late to give the 
neonate her breast.19  The absence of the breast jars the infant.  Psychoanalysis 
recognizes this disturbance as an existentially cataclysmic event.  The disturbance 
irreparably scars the neonate’s narcissistic holism. Yet the neonate’s frustration (and 
                                                 
19 We should also acknowledge that the bottle serves as a surrogate breast.   
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what is now attenuated satisfaction) coincides with a newfound subjectivity.20  She 
comes to understand her corporeality as constituting a distance from that of the mother 
and the environment.  The world now presents her with new opportunities and perils.   
I employ this characterization of the frustrated neonate as a theoretical template 
upon which we may begin to understand how the mature organism develops novel 
understanding and subsequent praxes.  However, I depart from a psychoanalytic 
epistemology in a significant way.  Whereas psychoanalysis emphasizes the role of 
desire  within and throughout social interaction, I focus on that which precedes and is 
fundamental to a desiring subject, experiential holism and subsequent discordance—
particularly as it pertains to primary trust.  Wherefore, I argue that the primordial 
distance between neonate and mother (and environment) takes on experiential meaning 
in respect to a will.  Following the rupture of primary narcissism, the neonate comes to 
understand loss and lack.  But loss and lack do not necessarily characterize her 
experiential microcosm.  The will pushes for reconnection and the experiential rupture 
gives breath to new ways of connecting, to new ways of understanding, to a newfound 
agency.  Within the context of experiential discontinuity, then, the will operates as an 
affective reflexivity; the dynamic that emerges from such reflexivity is novel 
communication between a sensory self and environment.    
Where does the neonate go from here?  Has she simply achieved subjectivity, an 
ossified self to enjoy for the rest of her years?  Looking to vast social philosophical and 
                                                 
20 There is much theoretical value to Freud’s delineation of the subjectivity-reality relationship.  However, 
the rich theoretical nuance of this relationship gives way to a number of questions and conceptual tensions.  
As such, a full discussion of this relationship is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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scientific literature on the self, which gives breath to the self’s fluidity and plasticity, we 
know that this idea of a once and for all subjectivity is not tenable.  Even after the loss of 
primary wholeness, experiential ruptures of self, other and environment continue.  
Hence, subjectivities emerge and change throughout the life-course.  
These later oedipal and post oedipal changes are not wholly different from the 
one initiated by the breach of primary narcissism.  Looking to the previous chapter, we 
may remember that the breach of the primal fantasy introduced the neonate to a 
traumatic existence, one in which her annihilation became a possibility.  How did she 
cope?  Klein (1946; 1959) suggests that she split mother (breast) into two alternate 
objects or realities.  What would otherwise be a single, volatile, precarious breast now 
became a good breast that remains and nourishes and a separate bad breast that frustrates 
and poisons.   
In so doing, the frustrated neonate protected and reconstituted her subjectivity via 
fantasy; she recreated a reality or mode of experience characterized by a semblance of 
her past narcissistic unity.  We could also say she recreates and maintains a socially 
rooted sense of personal Heimlich.  The relationship to the environment once again 
entails praxeological competence and existential confidence.  I have previously referred 
to this combination of qualities as the foundation for primary trust, but I now—moving 
away from a discussion of relational vulnerability—wish to delineate this particular 
combination in regards to the organism’s experiential understanding, an affective 
intelligibility.   
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Praxeological competence and existential confidence, together, constitute an 
experience that approaches (but never achieves) primary narcissism.  Employing the 
language of William James, we may now understand primary narcissism as a sense of 
holistic continuity within the tissue or flow of experience.  That is to say, the experiential 
flow of primary narcissism is continuous (without breaks or boundaries).  But as I have 
suggested with my introductory remarks, primary narcissism is not sustainable.  
Frustration of the will (the break in the flow of experiential omnipotence) inevitably 
occurs throughout the life course.  In the most benign form of such experiential 
discontinuity, the organism confronts a phenomenological hiccup.  Perhaps she 
experiences a temporary, uneventful period of unease and ambivalence.  In the most 
extreme circumstance, such experiential discontinuity manifests as traumatic: the 
organism undergoes severe psychical-affective harm.   
Like the neonate who splits the breast in fantasy, the maturing or adult organism 
undertakes fantasy work to maintain a semblance of narcissistic unity as well.  We may 
remember from the previous chapter that when major or minor discontinuities occur in 
the life trajectory (or in the everyday flow of experience), the organism will create and 
maintain everyday fantasies of security and control to circumvent or mitigate potential 
traumas.  We may also remember that the adult organism is not alone in this endeavor; 
she colludes with others.  She and others carry out such collective fantasy work via 
experiential praxis.   
To better delineate this reparation work, I again turn to Loewald’s structural 
theory of mind, specifically the oscillation of the primary and secondary processes.  
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Having noted that the organism reorganizes her experiences in a way that partially 
recaptures the will’s undisturbed expression, we may now note that the oscillatory praxis 
of the primary and secondary processes is a compromise formation.  The secondary 
process organizes a reality that demonstrates a unity of experience reminiscent of the 
primary process.  Although her experiences are no longer continuous, she attempts to 
recapture the incandescence of the primary process with a contiguous organization.   
With that said, however, we must now address how the present framework 
compliments and challenges the traditional psychoanalytic emphasis on the erotic life.  If 
the primary process will demonstrates a drive toward holistic experience, what then is 
the role of the libido or erotic object relations?  I argue, with some qualifying remarks, 
that we may view the two perspectives: the drive for holism and the pull of desire, as 
complementary rather than contradictory.  In making this argument, I—adhering to 
feminist scholarship—challenge the hetero-normative idea that sex must constitute some 
form of penetration or genital stimulation.  Freud, too, seems to imply such a challenge 
when he contends that any part of the body can serve as an erogenous zone and that 
organisms engage in sublimatory practices in which they channel their sexual energies 
toward socially appropriate ends.  But unlike Freud, I do not (for my present sociological 
purposes) regard these sexual practices as substitutory21; rather, I interpret them here as 
some of the many genuine expressions the will may take.22  Whereas I hold that the will 
                                                 
21 The substitution concept seems to imply that the practices in question are of a second handed or 
inauthentic nature. 
22 That is to say, I believe the present argument lends corporeal vissitudes a bit more plasticity than the 
traditional psychoanalytic discourse has.  
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necessarily seeks expression, I reject any notion of an essential object relationship for 
libidinal expression.    
Now penetration may conceptually resurface and lend theoretical salience to the 
sexual.  Perhaps we will find that sexual feelings demonstrate their greatest intensity 
when the organism wishes to merge with or corporeally ensconce the pleasurable object 
or pattern.  But such salience does not negate the sexual character of alternative 
activities.  While we should recognize that penetration is conceptually useful for 
delineating and differentiating sexual activity, we may also recognize that said 
usefulness does not legitimize conceptual reification.   
Having conceptually decoupled sex from penetration, can we rearticulate the 
sexual underpinnings of everyday life?  I believe we can.  Broadly speaking, sex is a 
visceral affair; it is a situation in which an object (material or ideal), person or 
environment engages the organism in way that elicits desire or (even if said desire is 
reluctant and/or unconscious) excitation of the will.  Furthermore, we may understand 
this process as a partial return to the unitary integrity of primary narcissism; the 
organism affectively reaches for connection and continuity.   
We should not, however, conflate the notion of pleasure with the libidinal or 
sexual drives.  The two entwine one another, but pleasure or the pleasure principle 
captures both the satisfaction and frustration of the libidinal drive, which we now define 
as a reach for holism.  Object relations theorists would articulate this holism as an 
integration between self and the world of objects.  I regard it as the holistic organization 
of self experience, which assumes a world of (differentiated) objects.  Libidinal cathexis, 
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then, need not imply that the organism wishes to consume or fuck the other; rather, she 
wishes to unite with the other in an experiential fashion that can and will take many 
forms (e.g., intercourse, friendship, kinship, etc.).23   
Having redefined the libidinal, we may retain the psychoanalytic centralization of 
sex within social discourse.  We may even envision a social existence in which libidinal 
relations constitute the opposite of and push away from the experientially disparate.  
Secondary process mentation then is not the subversion of the primary process will; 
rather, it is a socio-cultural recapitulation of affective satisfaction (i.e., sublimation).  
Such an idea will serve as a foundation for my present exposition of the difference 
between developing an affective understanding and the acquisition of symbolic 
knowledge.   
 
To Know Is Not to Understand 
From the previous chapter’s discussion, we know that in the absence of secondary 
processes, experiential holism splinters and trauma ensues.  Now we need to go beyond 
this determinism and explore consequences that overcome or forgo the traumatic.  What 
then is the relationship between the experientially discordant and the potential for 
experiential growth?  Outright, we should acknowledge that impeding the embodied will 
thrusts the organism into novel awareness; whence, she must reevaluate her 
understanding of the world.   
                                                 
23 It would be a mistake to not acknowledge Freud’s (1921; 1931) articulation of the life instincts, which 
argues that organisms are driven toward social connection.   
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Understanding, as I use it here, takes on paramount theoretical importance.  I 
conceptually differentiate the act, to understand, from the act, to know.  The former 
refers to an experiential presence or an affective intelligibility that integrates the 
organism with an environment, whereas the latter refers to an analytical process (which 
may be concomitant with but is not a replacement for the former); although such a 
process is necessarily affective, it does not necessarily constitute an affective connection 
or holism.   
The distinction between what we do not know and what we do not understand, 
then, is profound.  Much of social thought fails to differentiate the two and, 
consequently, draws implications that meet dubious ends.  Lack of knowledge suggests 
an absence of information.  To have inadequate knowledge may lead to an interruption 
in symbolic communication between self and others; it may even lead to a rupture (but 
not break or immobilization) in the symbolic constitution of self and others.  For 
instance, my student may not know the answer to a particular question asked of her, 
wherefore she may question her worth as an academic or my worth as an instructor. 
Despite her lack of knowledge, however, she understands the question asked, why I 
would ask such a question and the consequences of not having an answer (e.g., 
embarrassment, disappointment, ridicule, etc.).  Because she demonstrates 
understanding, she maintains experiential continuity and integrity within the immediate 
context; a route of action is available for her to navigate the environment competently.   
The student who does not understand the question I asked, who does not 
understand why I would ask such a question—does not understand the relationship 
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between the question and her present context—is an entirely different matter.  
Inadequate understanding or an inability to understand implies more than the disruption 
of symbolic communication; it implies an inability to ground experience, the organism’s 
fundamental mode of being in the world.  With lack of understanding, the fundamental 
properties of our mutual interaction break down and subsequent communication is 
rendered impossible or manifests as a form of violence.  The very integrity of situational 
reality is drawn into question.   
If my student cannot experientially understand my question, she has no means to 
engage me.  This may be the case if I ask her a jarringly provocative question: “Have 
you, personally, considered suicide?”  As a matter of knowledge, of knowing, she is 
quite capable of an answer.  But as a matter of her experiential understanding, of her 
affective intelligibility, she may find herself (perhaps only momentarily) without 
recourse.  The conventional inappropriateness of the question demonstrates an abrupt 
shift in relational intimacy.  The contextual expectations and habits that were at her 
service are now suspect.   
In regards to its praxeological implications, such a scenario is reminiscent of 
Talcott Parsons’ (1951) double contingency theorem, which suggests that the agentic 
nature of social interaction presents the scholar of social life with an epistemological 
problem: how is patterned interaction to proceed (i.e., how is social order possible) in the 
face novel possibility.  The solution, Parsons argues, is a preexisting normativity.  The 
values embodied in a “shared symbolic system” provide for shared expectations (and 
therefore predictable) social interaction.  Yet many scholars have criticized this solution, 
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calling it a form of cultural reductionism.  For example, Raf Vanderstraeten maintains, 
“Already available cultural value patterns penetrate [Parsons’s] action orientations to 
such an extent that the existence of a value consensus can be assumed in [all] interaction 
situations” (2002: 81).  Likewise, Niklas Luhmann (1995) argues that rather than assume 
their inheritance from one generation to the next a more apt solution to the problem of 
order would explain the formation of normality and culture.    
He further suggests that the solution does not have to pertain to the social 
dimension; rather, the temporal dimension provides a “functional equivalent.” He states, 
“At first, alter tentatively determines his behavior in a situation that is still unclear. He 
begins with a friendly glance, a gesture, a gift—and waits to see whether and how ego 
receives the proposed definition of the situation” (104).  In other words, one of two 
subjects may initiate interaction with normative presumptions, but these presumptions do 
not necessarily form the concrete foundation on which interaction proceeds.  Luhmann 
continues, “In light of this beginning, every subsequent step is an action with a 
contingency-reducing, determining, effect—be it positive or negative” (104-105). The 
normative base, then, is a “working” foundation.  It is amendable to situational 
dynamics, from which new systems of meaning may emerge.  Such an elaboration upon 
Parsons’s solution, Luhmann contends, raises the salience of contingency and, 
subsequently, chance.    
Highlighting that individuals are sensitive to chance and possibility, Luhmann 
suggests that we need not regard value consensus as an essential feature of social order.  
Previously disparate individuals invent value consensus in response to a need to reduce 
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complexity (and therefore mitigate anxiety).  Luhmann states, “The system emerges etsi 
no daretur Deus [even if God doesn't exist]” (1995: 105).   
Although he circumvents the problem of cultural reductionism, Luhmann 
arguably replaces one form of determinism for another.  Instead of reducing all 
interaction to culturally specific dictates, he reduces it to the need to process information 
efficiently.  I will temper my criticism of Luhmann for fear that ultimately I too fall into 
the trap of reductionism.  Suffice it to say that while both Parsons and Luhmann capture 
a facet of social experience, they fail to capture the theoretical significance of 
experiential understanding.  They demonstrate such failure by assuming that the 
presence of normativity (preexistent or newly created) precludes experiential ambiguity 
and ambivalence.   
Perhaps to say otherwise marries conceptual antagonisms or contradictions, but 
such is the nature of psychoanalytic insight.  The laws of the psyche do not follow the 
laws of logic.  Likewise, the experiential does not share the symbolic’s predictive 
formalism.  Thus, the normative (or rather the experience of normality) gives breathe to 
the uncanny and always carries the threat of traumatization.  We may liken the 
experiential, then, to epistemological dirt; it spoils normative structure and clouds 
conceptual clarity.   
In regards to my student, the rupture of normative experience hampers both the 
experiential flow between self and the world of objects and her unconscious fantasies of 
omnipotence.  The ostensibly benign, familiar, reliable circumstance gives way to its 
opposite.  She may experience the ordeal as hostile and subsequently withdraw from 
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future interaction, or she may regard the provocative question as a liberating reprieve 
from normal academic discourse and further engage the novel circumstance.24  Either 
way, the disjuncture introduces experiential disorganization and new possibility.  She 
must choose a path and reorganize her experiential awareness—her will compels her to 
once again become whole.   
Employing the aforementioned epistemological assertions about sex and the 
sexual, the student and I—socio-analytically speaking—engage sexually.  Our 
intellectual discourse is also a discourse of the will (our sexual energies are at play).  She 
or I may rupture or frustrate the familiar praxis (and experiential flow) of the classroom, 
but we are not content with frustration alone.  We work to reconnect, to reestablish an 
experiential continuity.  In so doing, we are not simply mirroring the conventional.  We 
will each other to understand.  Our wills are not left without recourse.  Social praxis, as I 
have alluded previously, is a primary means by which individual wills meet and find 
mutual expression. It is not a coincidence, then, that social praxis is also the primary 
means by which organisms circumvent potential traumatization—a topic to which we 
now turn.    
Whereas social structure does not exist to circumvent or mitigate the traumatic 
experience (I am not trying to make an essentialist argument here), we may still 
recognize that such an occurrence is ideally one of the consequences of cooperative 
interaction.  To understand this, we must elaborate upon the psychic conceptualization of 
                                                 
24 To be fair to Parsons, we should acknowledge that even in the event of experiential discontinuity 
normative social praxis (of one form or another) likely ensues.     
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the traumatic.  Aside from representing an incapacitation of ego activity, the traumatic is 
an experiential mode of (or lack thereof) being in the world.  On the one hand, it is the 
opposite of primary trust; it represents the obliteration of existential confidence and the 
obstruction of praxeological competence.  On the other hand, it is the obliteration of a 
social (as well as personal) fantasy—which we must note is not exclusive from primary 
trust—that sustains the narcissistic integrity of self’s relationship to her environment.   
 
Shit, the Fantasy of Dirt and the Dirty Other 
One such social fantasy—i.e., a fantasy that mitigates the traumatic—is the ritual praxis 
associated with managing the ostensibly traumatic horrors emanating from public 
bathrooms.  Now we should acknowledge that this stipulation is an over dramatization.  
The experience of using a public bathroom may be one of displeasure, but rarely does an 
individual bathroom-goer feel the angst of potential annihilation. Although we may also 
acknowledge that this particular social realm constitutes the threat of experiences so 
unpleasing that a muted (perhaps unconscious) sense of peril—however so 
momentarily—blemishes one’s existential confidence.  This is evidenced by the many of 
those who make significant efforts toward bodily planning and control to avoid using 
public restrooms.  While such planning and control is possibly a phobic response (and, 
therefore, represents aberrant activity) it reveals sensibilities that resonate with the 
“normal” population.   
Public bathrooms, after all, constitute a plethora of symbols, sentiments and 
sensations that disrupt the smooth flow of everyday experiences.  Perhaps the most 
 70 
 
obvious example is the public bathroom’s horrific association with shit.  Although such 
a concept is crass, a number of notable works have undertaken the metaphorical and 
material significance of shit (e.g., Freud 1905; 1917; Laporte 1978; Brown 1985) and I 
will demonstrate that shit’s crass connotation lends it a conceptual utility that is apt for 
the present discussion.  
We may readily acknowledge that human shit constitutes a form of dirt.  Mary 
Douglas (1966), the pioneer scholar of dirt in relation to the social, tells us that dirt 
becomes so by disturbing symbolic logics.  Douglas, however, is not the only scholar to 
have something to say about dirt’s relationship to the social.  The literature surrounding 
cultural notions of dirt and concomitant concepts (e.g., contagion, pollution, abjection, 
disgust, stigma) is diffuse and constitutes significant nuance. Nevertheless, almost all 
(perhaps all) of the dirt literature (at least implicitly) centers on the idea that dirt 
constitutes a threat or actual disruption to the integrity of an established boundary or 
order.  Douglas—elaborating upon Freud’s notion of dirt—exclaims, “Where there is 
system there is dirt.” The systemic, as I employ said concept here, does not necessarily 
refer to formalized patterns of activity, but rather collectively habituated ones.  Still, I--
like Douglas and other social scholars—understand system and systemic processes as 
entailing organization and boundaries.  Whereas Douglas emphasizes the symbolic in 
discussing the integrity of these boundaries, I emphasize the experiential.  Systemic 
boundaries, then, manage the integrity of experiential continuity or flow. 
Dirt, although deeply culpable for disruption to the integrity of symbolic 
knowledge, manifests through and threatens experiential understanding.  Returning to 
 71 
 
our discussion of shit, the experiential presence of this foulest of matter serves as an 
ideal metaphor for understanding experiential disruption.  Shit, however, is not readily 
subsumed by the aforementioned conceptualization of dirt.  Although, we can be sure 
that shit disturbs symbolic logics, it—unlike dirt—never has an appropriate context.  
That is to say, even when shit follows appropriate praxis—e.g., it stays out of public 
view—it remains dirty.   
Also, while one can clean or reorganize that which is dirty (and thereby remove 
its disturbing presence) one cannot confidently clean (or eliminate) shit.  Even in the 
absence of shit, the phenomenological threat of its contamination remains.  It is because 
restrooms have come into contact with shit that restroom users turn door and faucet 
handles with elbows or tissues in hand, cover toilet seats with tissue paper before sitting, 
and situate personal items with careful attention as to not come into contact with a 
particularly contaminating object.  Such behavior occurs in the cleanest of restrooms.  
This restroom praxis bolsters and is in response to the fantasy of ominously omnipotent 
dirt, which may demonstrate greater power than material reality. What is at stake, then, 
is not one’s physical safety or health, but rather her affective confidence—the primary 
trust she holds in everyday action.   
Take, for example, the ordinary park-goer.  What should be a benign, perhaps 
joyful, day for an individual visiting a public park becomes momentarily anxiety ridden 
when she realizes that she has to use and enter into a public restroom—or worse yet, a 
public porta-potty.  The fantastic horror of a sudden need to use such a public space 
disturbs a recreational park user’s experiential confidence and competence.  By means of 
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her fantastical projection of dirt, she must confront an imaginary contagion (dirt, filth, 
shit, germs, disease, etc.) in the most intimate of circumstances, defecation.  
The situation makes the vulnerability of corporeal boundaries experientially 
salient.  Her primary trust begins to wane as she struggles to maintain efficacy over her 
corporeal purity.  She may control the direction of her gaze; she may choose the surfaces 
with which she makes physical contact; she may even hold her breath or breath 
shallowly to mitigate the stench that invades her olfactory sense; but she cannot control 
her imagination, not entirely at least.  In effect, the very techniques she employs to 
protect the integrity of her corporeal being also make salient the fantasy of contagion 
and concomitant danger. 
  What then is she to do in this situation of experiential discontinuity?  What does 
she do with the sight, smell and (in the worst possible scenario) feel of shit?  Well we 
should acknowledge this disruption is a periodic one and she already has an arsenal of 
strategies for coping with such a circumstance.  She habituates her body to the 
discomfort of retaining excretal matter and simply waits until she can relieve herself 
safely in a personal, familiar dwelling.  Or she becomes adept at psychically deflecting 
the experience of horrifying matter and concomitant memory traces.  She may even 
develop confidence in the praxis of purification—e.g., the idea that soap and water 
removes all contaminates.  But such circumstances do not constitute situations in which 
she reflexively engages the environment and develops a novel mode of being in the 
world.  Rather such praxes constitute strategies of repression and experiential 
conservatism.   
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Turning our analysis toward a concern for the social system, we may now 
acknowledge that the collective copes with shit by hiding it beneath the normative, 
clean, safe infrastructure of society.  That is to say, the social system deals with shit by 
banishing it.  The praxis of shit then is that of collective repression, of coping by 
denial.25  At the extreme, a delusional culture denies shit’s existence, but more often the 
collective simply denies shit’s unique intelligibility and thereby ceases genuine 
communication with (i.e., an effort to understand) the shitty.  With that said, the 
situation that interests us presently is the one in which the organism does not deflect dirt 
(the discordant experience), but rather transforms and reintegrates it.  Psychoanalysis 
teaches us, after all, that only with creative reintegration can we abreact traumatic 
memory traces and achieve catharsis.  The creative reintegration of dirt, filth or shit, 
however, confronts a somatic obstacle: disgust.  The academic discussion of disgust is 
vast, but not resolute.  Those works that are relatively less humanistic reduce disgust to 
biological attributes (Wicker et al. 2003; Oaten, Stevenson, and Case 2009; Rozin and 
Fallon 1987). This deterministic articulation of disgust contends that the ontological 
result of evolution is the circumstance in which animals innately find spoiled or diseased 
matter repulsive.  Yet the more humanistic works emphasize the cultural variability of 
                                                 
25 This idea is in many ways commensurate with Philip Slater’s delineation of, “…the Toilet 
Assumption—the notion that unwanted matter, unwanted difficulties, unwanted complexities and 
obstacles will disappear if they’re removed from our immediate field of vision” (1970: 19).  Though the 
reader should also acknowledge that there are nuanced differences between the two concepts and these 
differences have significant epistemological consequences.  Whereas Slater’s concept emphasizes the 
systemic need to hide and ignore the aberrant and undesirable, the concept I employ here—as I will make 
apparent throughout the remainder of this dissertation—suggests active, systemic repression of that which 
reveals systemic inadequacy (and thereby undermines primary trust).  With that said, future studies may 
employ both concepts as complimentary counterparts.  
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disgust.  This is not to suggest that disgust is simply a learned narrative or an out 
cropping of a particular symbolic logic; rather, disgust involves the habitual, 
subconscious life of the body, which emerges from and is in continuous dialog with the 
organism’s cultural milieu (Miller 1997; Seidman 2012).  So one’s relationship to a 
disgusting process or thing, like all disturbing relationships, can undergo abreaction and 
associative absorption (see previous chapter).    
Returning to our exposition of dirt, and specifically shit, we also should 
acknowledge that Organisms are not necessarily disgusted (or horrified) by dirt or the 
dirtied.  By saying such, I do not mean to emphasize that dirt simultaneously gives way 
to fascination or arousal.  Rather the point I wish to make is that dirt or the dirtied may, 
at least in fantasy, constitute a plethora of experiential and symbolic opportunities.  
Through cooperation with praxis, dirt remains dirt (the dirty remain dirty) but may 
achieve acceptance and, at times, admiration.   
Take the stigmatized though highly appreciated custodial worker as an example.  
Her status role is that of a low skill and thereby highly replaceable laborer, but to say 
such is to speak specifically to systemic concerns.  Experientially, she reduces the 
everyday burden of filth.  When others periodically and momentarily do not take her for 
granted, they see her as invaluable.   
With that said, we need to remember that even when dirt or the dirtied receive 
admiration, they remain socially less than; wherefore, they only achieve attenuated 
acceptance.  Perhaps we may regard such acceptance as an act of fetishization.  I do not 
make this suggestion in reference to the seductive lure of dirt that Kristeva (1982) 
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articulates; rather I wish to highlight the self-congratulatory satisfaction of 
demonstrating a pious or moral demeanor.   
As William Ian Miller brings to our attention: 
Humility is a virtue that can’t work its way out of a psychological paradox it 
always finds itself in.  If granting of rewards is based on how humble you are, 
then you find yourself in a system in which the attainment of humility provides 
the means for being looked up to by others and thus for knowing yourself 
superior to those who are looking up to you.  You become proud of your humility 
and enjoy the payoff of winning the humility contest. (1998: 157) 
 
We will likely find such humility contests operating in respect to dirt.  In other words, 
with a high degree of social esteem at stake, we may very well find that one’s 
association with dirty, contagious others involves the practice of conspicuous charity 
(Anderson 2009).  In such a circumstance, pure subjects can circumvent the hazard of 
experiential discontinuity that dirt would otherwise facilitate by projecting a 
prepackaged, postemotional (Mestrovic 1997) logic onto dirty others.  Such logic 
articulates the presence of dirty others as helpable (or cleanable)—i.e., as a systemically 
manageable problem, rather than as collectively repressed, systemic waste.  
Yet we should not assume that interaction with and acceptance of the 
downtrodden always occurs through such duplicitous means.  A primary thesis of this 
argument is that experiential understanding may follow from the experience of dirt.  One 
does not have to repress or clean away dirt; rather, she may creatively reintegrate it into 
her everyday praxis.  In this circumstance, one eclipses or forgoes socially mediated 
boundaries of experience.  Consequently, the Dirty need not remain socially less than.  
An openness to the dirty Other, then, is an openness to (and reintegration of) discordant 
experience.   
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 Before we further unpack the theoretical implications of this claim, however, we 
need to address the notion of otherness, which—like dirt—seems to imply a concern for 
boundaries.  Steven Seidman suggests that  
An elaborated account of otherness assumes a social world that is symbolically 
divided into two antagonistic orders: a symbolic-moral order conferring full 
personhood and a respected civil status and its antithesis, a defiled order. (2012: 
4) 
 
To maintain continuity with the present discussion, we should note that a symbolic order 
is part and parcel of an affective-experiential one.  As I suggested in the previous 
chapter, the symbolic is not mutually exclusive from the affective.  Obviously, the 
defiled order corresponds to our present understanding of dirt; its operations challenge 
systemic fantasies of purity.   
Seidman continues:  
The civil/defilement symbolic divide assumes politics of managing the fluid 
borderlands separating these orders. Border politics are at the heart of the 
sociology of the Other. Figures of difference become Other if they are 
symbolically associated with a condition of excess and ungovernability. The 
Other is represented not merely as deficient or eccentric, but as defiled or 
fundamentally debased and grotesque. (4) 
 
Not simply difference but an inability to achieve systemic integration, then, perpetuates 
the social practice of othering.  The excess and ungovernability of which Seidman 
speaks points to a systemic deficiency or lack of efficacy.  Such an Other represents a 
dangerous outsider; wherefore, her impediment to systemic functioning is the alien 
quality of her person.  
Yet the dirty Other that concerns us presently does not demonstrate an alien 
quality, but rather an all too familiar one—a familiarity that threatens.  Reflecting back 
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upon Douglas’ writings, we recognize that dirt is not alien matter, but rather matter out 
of place.  In making this point, Douglas wishes to emphasize the threatening presence 
dirt demonstrates toward the ordered world.  But we could also recognize that though 
dirt disrupts systemic order, it comes from and remains a familiar part of the social 
system. Hairs in the bathroom sink and papers strewn about a desktop, after all, are not 
experientially unintelligible; rather, they are just off-putting.  Dirt then represents a 
latent outcropping of systemic processes.  Although this outcropping causes minor, 
periodic disruption, it is readily reintegrated into systemic praxes and fulfills an array of 
other societal needs. We might say—in opposition to Douglas—that while Dirt 
manifests as contentious praxis, it remains symbolically legitimate.  Just as Kai Erikson 
(1961) demonstrates with the presence of crime, the presence of dirt reinforces 
sociocultural boundaries and justifies the presence of a managerial infrastructure, which 
provides employment and a means for curtailing dirt’s troublesome nature.  
But what about the systemic outcroppings that operate as waste—that which the 
social system fails to reintegrate?  What kind of dirt and dirty Other are we left with 
then?  I argue that such a dirty Other takes the status of shit; she represents matter so 
threatening an appropriate context cannot be found for her; hence, systemic repression 
takes the place of reintegration.  What is frightening about her is not that she 
demonstrates an alien or non-normative character, but rather that her grotesqueness—
i.e., that quality which makes her morally and aesthetically reprehensible—is all too 
familiar.  To confront her is to confront one’s own shit; to confront one’s own shit is to 
confront the base, fantasy shattering reality of one’s personhood.   
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 Let us return to the hypothetical scenario in which I ask a student if she has 
considered committing suicide.  In one figurative sense, I am asking her to confront the 
shit of her existence.  What does she have to live for?  In other words, why would she 
believe her life is worth living?  Or what value does she have as a person?  Having 
received the question, however, does not necessarily entail engagement with said 
question.  She may circumvent an opportunity to confront the shit of her existence by 
acting defensively.  If she is defensive, if she maintains her familiar experiential 
boundaries, she may deflect introspection into her dirty existence and project the horror 
of dirt onto my character.  She may reason that I, her professor, am the one out of place, 
that I have an inappropriate understanding of the context.  By employing such a defense, 
she maintains her experiential holism; her primary trust remains intact.   
But what if she remains open to the experiential dirt facilitated by my 
provocative question?  On the one hand, she becomes vulnerable to annihilation.  Death 
by her own volition is now a real possibility and the meanings that constitute her being 
now require worth and justification.  On the other hand, she may acquire a new sense of 
agency.  Again, death by her own volition is now a real possibility! She may find that the 
meanings that presently constitute her being provide little if any sustenance (are without 
justification).  Or she may endeavor to create or find new meaning. Consequently, what 
was an ostensibly fixed way of being in the world receives novel contours.   
With that said, the present argument does not seek to answer or elaborate upon 
the Absurdist dictum: Is life worth living?  Because the present argument seeks 
sociological insight we now bring the discussion of dirt, the dirtied other and shit back to 
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more systemic concerns.  We may ask: What structural factors inhibit the potential for 
growth following experiential discordance?  I have already alluded to one: in guarding 
against the traumatic, social praxis demonstrates a conservative bias by placing 
excessive constraint on the experiential; wherefore, our everyday rituals circumvent the 
potential for novel awareness.  For example, many of us discard our daily waste in a 
ritualized manner that forgoes individual responsibility and meta-systemic reflection.  
Yet our waste can reemerge in perilous ways.   
Recent “natural” disasters, such as hurricane Sandy, represent such experientially 
discordant events.  One’s acceptance and exploration of the discontinuity facilitated by 
events like Sandy may evolve into a new understanding and ritualistic disposition toward 
systemic waste.  Again, we must remember that understanding implies more than having 
knowledge of.  The knowledge that such crises are possible existed well before Sandy.  
But the experience of such events grounds scholarly abstractions.  Now the organism has 
a direct sense of environmental peril.  She need not maintain her primary trust 
defensively; she may forge new habitual praxes.  (Although, her individual efforts—e.g., 
developing sustainable consumption habits—will do little to protect her from the 
ramifications of systemic waste.)  
Another structural inhibition to experiential growth is the moral enterprise, which 
perpetuates the fetishization of dirt.  As Howard S. Becker (1963) brings to our attention, 
these enterprises typically purport a narrative of continued progress, but never one of 
complete success.  He explains that a culmination of its primary task would mean that 
the enterprise could no longer legitimate its continued existence and power.  The moral 
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enterprise, then, has significant incentive to embellish the very problem it seeks to 
eliminate.  As the public becomes more aware and afraid of said problem, the more 
willingly its members grant the moral enterprise power and resources.   
In respect to shit, however, the moral enterprise confronts a precarious task.  In 
one respect, shit constitutes a fantasized omnipotence that provokes a great deal of 
public fear.  In another respect, however, shit constitutes repressed waste; the unearthing 
of which troubles the collective’s fantasy of purity and its faith in systemic praxis.  
While we may acknowledge that moral opportunists gladly exploit the fear of all things 
dirty, they avoid involvement with shit (which by definition is unmanageable without 
significant systemic restructuring).  The moral enterprise is not in the business of 
changing conventional praxis; rather, it typically seeks to protect the status quo.  The 
presence of shit reflects a problem perpetuated by the system, not to the system.  
Consequently, a moral enterprise will operate as a hygienic order that represses, rather 
than corrects, the problem of shit.   
With such orders, however, there is more at stake than organizational power and 
legitimacy; also at stake is an existential confidence in the system as is.  Wherefore, 
these orders work to maintain a framework of meaning, specifically a pervasive ethos of 
purity.  In other words, Becker’s logic still holds if we relinquish an emphasis on 
rational, calculative action.26  However, the more salience these orders generate around 
narratives of purity, the greater the phenomenological presence and power of shit; the 
                                                 
26 In other words we are not examining the circumstance in which moral enterprises necessarily exploit or 
take advantage of public fears.   
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more clean and wholesome an object, idea or place is held, the more vulnerable said 
object, idea or place becomes to the powers of contamination.  Despite their better 
efforts, hygienic orders cannot sustain the repressive fantasy of purity.  The experiential 
will always spill beyond the parameters of the social system’s symbolic structures.  No 
one essentialist narrative of moral or aesthetic beauty will capture and stay honest to 
one’s experience of the world.  Experience remains unavoidably dirty.         
Although I have suggested that habituated praxes demonstrates a conservative 
bias, it is by means of praxis that the organism can create new experiential boundaries.  
Praxis facilitates abreaction; through praxeological incorporation, the organism 
decathects the contaminating power of a dirty object; wherefore, the organism may 
transform dirt into experiential nectar.  Such transformational praxes often follow from 
other moral accounts: environmental, counter cultural, academic, etc.  Are we not, then, 
replacing one hygienic order with another?  Perhaps we are, but in so doing we can 
move away from fantasies of purity and their subsequent implications.  Thus, a praxis 
and concomitant fantasy that seeks to transform systemic waste or shit—rather than 
eradicate it—is a step in the right direction.  
 For this to occur, however, the sociocultural infrastructure must permit 
opportunities for systemic openness to that which horrifies; only then can a culture 
understand and assimilate the morally, aesthetically and symbolically aberrant.  Such an 
infrastructure must seek a dialog with the experiential and provide a space for 
experiential play.  However, neither “opportunities for systemic openness” nor 
“experiential play” imply radical acceptance.  I employ openness here to mean a 
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negotiated space in which new realities, new ways to experience the world, are possible 
(but not inevitable).  Likewise, I use the metaphor of play to suggest a liminal process in 
which institutions undertake the creative fantasizing necessary to explore new ways of 
being in the world while distancing these experimental realities from an immediate 
influence on “the serious life.”  
As of now it may be the case that recondite abstractions inundate the present 
articulation of experiential discontinuity and subsequent transformation.  To remedy this, 
the next chapter addresses two experientially concrete accounts, Camus’ novel, The 
Stranger and the United States Courts Martial transcript of Specialist Steven A. Ribordy, 
to help facilitate greater conceptual clarity.  In the former account, the reader confronts a 
systemically alien other, Meursault.  The praxis he employs, after all, seems antithetical 
to conventional understanding; that is to say, his demeanor contrasts with the social 
decorum.  As such, Meursault’s actions may not constitute dirt in the “all too familiar 
sense” of which I spoke previously.  But is he an experientially alien Other?  Even if the 
reader cannot identify with Meursault’s personal sensibilities, she may demonstrate a 
familiar understanding of the distance Meursault experiences between his personal 
feelings and those feelings that others expect of him.  For this reason, I find that 
Meursault fits the epistemological classification of shit.   
Addressing the latter account, the reader confronts an exemplary dirty Other, 
Specialist Ribordy.  As will be made clear, Ribordy serves as the quintessential example 
of systemic waste or shit.  The peril that his presence commands is the base familiarity 
he represents.  To be specific, Ribordy represents a systemic inability to guide a well-
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intentioned subject away from moral (or legal) misfortune.  Ribordy’s experience with 
The Department of Military Justice characterizes the aforementioned practices of 
systemic denial and repression.   
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CHAPTER IV 
DIRTY ACCOUNTS AND LEGAL PURITY: THE FORMAL OBFUSCATION OF 
EXPERIENTIAL DISCONTINUITY  
 
A Familiar Stranger? 
Meursault—the protagonist of Camus’(1942) classic novel The Stranger—demonstrates 
a demeanor that is ostensibly antithetical to the conventional trope of a folk hero.  When 
norm or custom calls for a showing of sympathy or remorsefulness, Meursault 
demonstrates disinterest and callousness.  Such is the case when Meursault speaks of his 
mother’s death.  He narrates, “Maman died today. Or yesterday maybe, I don't know” 
(3). Though the reader may wish to characterize Meursault as one who is amoral, she 
will likely find that such a characterization is contextually inappropriate.  Despite her 
reluctance to identify with Meursault, the reader cannot deny that he remains genuine 
amongst duplicitous others.  Perhaps this is a disposition she understands well—an 
understanding which lends Meursault’s presence an uncanny, and thereby 
uncomfortable, familiarity. 
Furthermore, it is his very authenticity that complicates Meursault’s existence 
within the cultural milieu, within the social system.  This system impinges upon 
Meursault’s symbolic-affective constitution in such a way that the potential for 
experiential reductionism and violence upon his person is great.  We see such 
implications when the court demands Meursault account for why he killed the Arab.  
Meursault—speaking to the affective-experiential intelligibility of the event—explains, 
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“…it was because of the sun” (103).  What Meursault tries to convey here is an affective 
experience that has an intelligibility of its own accord.  Although his answer is, arguably, 
as sincere as it can be, the court administrators laugh at the account and, thereby, refuse 
to give it sincere consideration.   
The court’s formal operations lack appropriate epistemological equipment for 
understanding that which is conventionally and analytically unintelligible.  Systemic 
justice, then, requires a reason that fits, or is made to fit, within the normative order of 
things.  Deflecting and repressing Meursault’s reasoning—which does not adhere to the 
logic of systemic morality, but rather the embodied intonations emerging from a 
situational reflexivity—the court administrators label Meursault pathological and ill-
willed.  They cite the ostensible callousness he demonstrated toward his mother’s death, 
a matter far removed from the crime at hand.  Such action demonstrates their desperate 
reach for a fantastic certitude to ground their moral understanding and action.   
Because Meursault’s existence so embodies the systemically unintelligible, his 
very presence disturbs both the symbolic structure of and the experiential flow facilitated 
by the court’s legal proceedings.  Meursault’s presence, then, demonstrates the character 
of a stranger.  With that said, he is a not simply an alien other; rather, his presence 
represents the return of a repressed, primordial understanding that operates outside of 
socialized, moral dictates.  In this respect his presence demonstrates the power of shit.   
Because the court administrators cannot make sense of (i.e., cannot employ legal logic 
toward) Meursault’s account, they are unable to situate it within an appropriate legal 
category and effectively clean it away.  So how do the administrator’s handle 
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Meursault’s account?  They deny it.  Though they have no reason to doubt what he says, 
they repress his testimony; as concerns the law, Meursault’s experience did not happen.  
We are left with a courtroom fantasy that obfuscates the shit presence that Meursault 
demonstrates. The administrators project onto to him a misanthropic villain who 
deserves nothing less than state sanctioned death.  The court then operates as a hygienic 
order which denies genuine communication with contaminating experience.   
Before we discontinue our discussion of Meursault’s case, we should 
acknowledge that the priest, a socio-cultural arbiter for systemic morality, provides 
Meursault with an opportunity to relinquish his association with shit (at least for a 
projection of an omnipotent Other, God).  By imploring Meursault to seek absolution in 
faith, the priest pushes him to accept and repent for his guilt.  If Meursault heeds the 
Priest’s admonitions, he may take on the status of one who is dirty, yet cleanable—i.e., 
one who reinforces the systemic morality.  But Meursault embraces the shitty essence of 
his experience, and he allows his filthy way to spill about and muck up the systemic 
machinery.  Not his acts or his opinions, then, but rather his very being becomes the dirt 
or shit that fouls up the system.  By remaining unrepentant, he inhibits the social 
system’s ability to maintain fantasies of purity, of moral efficacy in matters of moral 
ineptitude.  
 
The Repressive Cleansing of Experience  
We can make an apt comparison between Meursault’s case and the courts-martial of 
Specialist Steven A. Ribordy.  The United States Military Justice System charged 
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Ribordy and four other U.S. soldiers with conspiracy to murder five Iraqi detainees 
during active duty in Iraq in the Spring of 2007 (an event the media has labeled “Killings 
at the Canal” (CNN 2009)).  Specialist Ribordy, however, did not kill anyone, nor did he 
have prior knowledge that the members of his unit were going to execute Iraqi detainees. 
What Ribordy did do is follow orders, which instructed him to drive a military vehicle to 
a site specified to be holding said detainees.27  Upon his arrival, however, Ribordy finds 
the detainees dead.  His commanding officers then instruct him to help his peers discard 
the dead into the canal.   
During his courts-martial trial, Ribordy delineates the experience as follows: 
There hadn't been too much time that went by when we got told that we were 
going out again.  At the time I didn't think anything was unusual because we 
would roll out for anything…. 
After leaving the [command observation post] I asked what we were 
doing and why we were leaving and everything.  First Sergeant responded that 
we were going to go take care of these guys.  At the time I didn't know quite 
what it meant, but I… was a PV2 at the time, I don't question a first sergeant.  So 
I just followed the patrol and did what I was told to…. [Upon arrival] I was told 
to… pull security by first sergeant.  So I complied…. 
A little bit of time passed and I had to get out of the truck and use the 
bathroom.  When I stepped out of the truck… I saw three Soldiers….  When I 
walked up I saw that it was First Sergeant Hatley,… Sergeant First Class Mayo, 
and Sergeant Leahy….  I approached and as I got a little bit closer I saw… there 
was three bodies right in front of them.  And it was the individuals that we had 
detained earlier.  There was the smell of fresh gunshot, guns being fired, in the 
air.  And there was a lot of blood and--on the ground, right where the bodies lay.  
Yeah, I recognized that the individuals were from the photos that I had taken and 
then I remembered that First Sergeant said that "we were going to go take care of 
these guys. 
At first I only saw the three bodies laying there, so I walked up and all I 
wanted to do was get out of there.  That way nobody could get caught or 
                                                 
27 It is important to note that Ribordy’s orders involve more than formal or authoritative stipulations.  
Concomitant with these orders are a set of trained habits, which specify where and how to park a military 
vehicle, where and when to serve as a look-out, etc.    
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anything like that.  I just wanted to get on.  As I helped move one of the bodies 
into the canal, I saw the other body that had already been placed in the canal.  
After I moved that body, I walked back to the truck.  I got in.  Shut the door.  
Closed my mouth.  Didn't say a word.  And that's when I really remembered, you 
know, and I put two and two together that "we're going to go take care of these 
guys," meant we were going to go kill them.28 
 
Ribordy’s account seems to demonstrate a thorough attentiveness to the experiential 
flow of the events in question.  However, the court cannot accept his initial articulation 
of the matter; his account—in the context of a systemic legal structure—takes the form 
of symbolic and experiential dirt.  The primary contaminant transforming the account 
from systemically clean to aberrant is Ribordy’s narrative absence of a definitive 
moment of awareness or understanding that he had colluded in a premeditated plan to 
kill the detainees.   
With that said, we could say that Ribordy’s account, like Meursault’s, acquires 
the status of shit.  After all, if Ribordy’s experience is one in which he does not 
demonstrate definitive, analytical understanding of a decision to participate in a 
conspiracy to kill detainees or even to break military protocol then his presence 
represents a problem for which no clear systemic route of action is apparent.  But the 
legal authority cannot acknowledge the systemic shit, which confusing matters of war 
produce.  To do so would undermine the collective’s fantasy of purity as it pertains to an 
organized war effort, an efficacious command climate and the integrity of moral 
guidelines for combat.   
                                                 
28 This passage is a direct quotation from the record of trial of The United States Courts-Martial of 
Specialist Steven A. Ribordy (U.S. Military Justice System 2008).  As for the quotations presented 
throughout the remainder of this section, the reader may assume that they too are from this transcript.   
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Accordingly, the court requests (under the threat of severe sanction) that Ribordy 
adjust his account to better fit a particular verdict.  In other words, the courts-martial 
needs Ribordy to articulate a definitive motive and decision to kill and thereby clean up 
his account to better adhere to the symbolic logic of legal-rational categories. Otherwise, 
the charge, “conspiracy to commit premeditated murder,” loses meaning and Ribordy’s 
exact culpability in the matter is unclear.  Now it may seem that Ribordy has a legal 
advantage, that by refusing to adjust his account  he can exploit the shortcomings of the 
legal-rational framework.  In Ribordy’s case, however, the trial proceedings and 
outcome are predicated upon a prefabricated narrative of the event in question.   
The military legal structure is able to coerce Ribordy’s compliance—and 
therefore maintain the systemic fantasy of purity—with a particular cleansing 
mechanism, the pretrial agreement.  This particular legal device operates as a contract in 
which trial proceedings follow the direction of a previously agreed upon legal theory.    
The court gives Ribordy strong incentive to accept a pretrial agreement.  To quote the 
Military Judge, “…[Ribordy] gets the benefit of whichever is less, each element of the 
sentence of the court or that contained in… [the] pre-trial agreement, which is eight 
months imprisonment.”   
Now if Ribordy refuses to adjust the initial (legally unclear) account of his 
experience, the pretrial deal becomes null and void.  The military judge states, “If for 
some reason your plea of guilty at any time becomes unacceptable, the trial counsel will 
be free to proceed on all of the charges and specifications.”  This means that the case 
will go to trial by military judge and no jury if Ribordy’s account in any way contests the 
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pretrial deal.  In the event that such a trial occurs, it would commence during the 
immediate proceeding.  Within this new circumstance, the conspiracy to commit 
premeditated murder would again be in effect and Ribordy’s admittance of guilt for 
accessory after the fact to premeditated murder would still stand.   
Furthermore, Ribordy’s prior admittance makes any decision to renege on the 
pretrial agreement legally irrelevant.  The judge states, “A plea of guilty is equivalent to 
a conviction and is the strongest form of proof known to the law.  On your plea alone 
and without receiving any evidence, this court can find you guilty of the offense to 
which you have pled guilty.”  Also in the event of a new trial, mandatory minimum 
sentencing laws bind the Judge’s ruling.  If he finds Ribordy guilty, the Judge must give 
him a sentence of life in prison without parole.  As is now obvious, the pretrial 
agreement compels Ribordy to remain committed to the pre-constructed narrative. 
Yet the pretrial agreement is not the only mechanism maintaining systemic 
fantasies of purity.  The court proceedings constitute an elaborate set of rituals that also 
serve this function.  For example, Before the judge permit’s Ribordy to testify he 
socializes him to the court’s symbolic logic.  He methodically explains how Ribordy 
should organize and interpret his experience within legal parameters.   
You can be guilty as an accessory after the fact only if, in addition to all other 
elements of the offense: 
First, that four male detainees are dead; [This is actually an interesting 
point because no bodies were ever discovered.  There is no physical evidence 
that the crime was committed.] 
Second, that their deaths resulted from the acts of First Sergeant John E. 
Hatley, Sergeant First Class Joseph P. Mayo, and Sergeant Michael P. Leahy Jr. 
  Third, that the killings of the four male detainees were unlawful; and 
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Fourth, that at the time of the killings First Sergeant John E. Hatley, Sergeant 
First Class Joseph P. Mayo, and Sergeant Michael P. Leahy Jr. had a 
premeditated design to kill the four male detainees.   
 
We may acknowledge that the last point illustrates that Ribordy’s guilt is contingent 
upon the guilt of the “co-accused.”  If the court cannot establish premeditation—e.g., if 
the court cannot show that at the time of the incident the co-accused were “aware” that 
they followed unlawful orders—then Ribordy cannot be guilty of conspiracy to commit 
premeditated murder.29   
 Consequently, Ribordy’s intentions and actions during the event in question are 
not as legally significant in determining his guilt as those of the co-accused.  Wherefore, 
we further see the Judge help Ribordy interpret his experience in a way that confirms, or 
at least suggests, the fulfillment of the aforementioned stipulations for premeditation to 
commit murder to be a valid charge.   
MJ: Now I want to talk about what you knew.  Most of the questions I 
just went through all had to deal with whether or not a crime, in fact, occurred.  
Did you know that First Sergeant Hatley, Sergeant First Class Mayo, and 
Sergeant Leahy committed premeditated murder of the four detainees? 
  ACC: Yes I did, Your Honor. 
  MJ: At what point did you know that? 
  ACC: As I approached. 
  MJ: What do you mean by, "as you approached"? 
  ACC: As I--after I got out of the vehicle and I started moving to their 
location, that's when I knew that they had committed the murders. 
MJ: You had mentioned earlier that it wasn't until you got back to your 
HMMWV--after that, that you put two and two together? 
ACC: I misspoke, Your Honor… I realized what they had done when I 
got up there and prior to me helping them move the bodies. 
 
                                                 
29 The reader should note that at the time of Ribordy’s hearing the co-accused are still awaiting trial.   
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If we juxtapose this last part of the passage with Ribordy’s first account, that is the 
account that was not produced in a piecemeal fashion following the MJ’s questions, we 
see something interesting.  In the first account, Ribordy delineates his experience as 
follows:  
Yeah, I recognized that the individuals were from the photos that I had taken and 
then I remembered that First Sergeant said that "we were going to go take care of 
these guys."  At first I only saw the three bodies laying there, so I walked up and 
all I wanted to do was get out of there. That way nobody could get caught or 
anything like that.    
 
In this passage it seems as if Ribordy acknowledges the moral dubiousness of the event, 
but he does not specify the exact problem. He continues:  
I just wanted to get on.  As I helped move one of the bodies into the canal, I saw 
the other body that had already been placed in the canal.  After I moved that 
body, I walked back to the truck.  I got in.  Shut the door.  Closed my mouth.  
Didn't say a word.  And that's when I really remembered, you know, and I put 
two and two together that "we're going to go take care of these guys," meant we 
were going to go kill them.  
 
Although Ribordy indicates that the situation has become experientially concrete to him, 
it is still difficult for the listener (and reader) to determine the specific point at which 
Ribordy comes to a holistic understanding of the circumstance.  The admission, “And 
that’s when I really remembered,” suggests an understanding that achieves holism 
retrospectively.   
Now when we see the second attempt to recapture the event in question (i.e., the 
modified account that Ribordy gives in response to the judge’s specific questions) the 
story appears cleaner.  The Military Judge asks, “You had mentioned earlier that it 
wasn't until you got back to your HMMWV--after that, that you put two and two 
together?” And Ribordy responds, “I misspoke, Your Honor.  I put—I realized what they 
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had done when I got up there and prior to me helping them move the bodies.”  To fully 
understand the significance of his response, we should remember that the pretrial 
agreement binds Ribordy to a specific articulation of his account—one that maintains the 
legitimacy of a guilty plea. 
   
Dirt and Agency 
Having acknowledged that dirt is disruptive, we may now note that cleaning or 
organizing the dirtied facilitates practical action (Dant and Bowles 2003).  We may also 
acknowledge that formal codes and procedures designed to remove dirt facilitate 
collective agency. After all, dirt is troublesome.  Why, then, should the Military Justice 
System not channel Ribordy’s account into specific articulations?  If the court does not 
contort and confine his account, how is The Military Justice System to make any 
decision on and take subsequent action toward Ribordy’s possible wrong doing?  This is 
a fair question, but it makes two fallacious assumptions.  First, we need not assume that 
effective or moral action can follow only from “clean,” analytical reasoning.  Second, 
we need not assume that the patterned nature of systemic logic is inherently antagonistic 
toward the, at times, idiosyncratic nature of experiential understanding.   
Addressing the first assumption, we may acknowledge that sociology has long 
established the dangers of conflating “clean,” analytical reason or inflexible logic with 
morality. Such an idea demonstrates an implicit, if not explicit premise, in the works of 
Max Weber (1922), Zygmunt Bauman (1989), George Ritzer (2004) and many others.  
As sociologists, then, we understand that social life is infinitely complex; no rule or 
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category can capture the nuance of experiential existence.30  Consequently, any absolute 
measure for gauging the experiential world perpetuates a system of violence.  It is 
beyond the scope of this argument to cover the full spectrum of such violence; suffice it 
to say that general adherence to such mechanisms represents what Zygmunt Bauman 
(1995) refers to as procedural morality: an obligation to a rule or procedure that devalues 
humanistic sensibilities.   
Bauman’s postulate presents us with another question: What are the alternatives 
to procedural morality?  As I have demonstrated in the introduction to this dissertation, 
the late modernity theorists attempt to present us with several such possibilities: the pure 
relationship (1991a; 1991b), a being-for the other disposition (Bauman 1995; 2001), and 
the cosmopolitan conscience (Beck 1996; 1998; 2000; 2002).  These concepts 
represent well intentioned alternatives to conventional morality.  Yet I argue that 
these ideas rest upon a faulty epistemological assumption, the understanding that 
social relationships can or should be pure.  For Bauman (1995) and Giddens 
(1991a; 1991b), this purity pertains to a social communion that exists outside of 
convention, custom, normality and the like.   
Bauman elaborates that in such a circumstance—what he refers to as Being-for 
the other—individuals engage one another as whole selves.  That is to say, if individuals 
can relinquish or transcend conventional dictates, the whole self is able to emerge from 
and within a specific interaction.  Anthony Giddens makes a similar claim.  He suggests 
the late modern age holds the potential for the “pure relationship: a social relation which 
                                                 
30 Hence, the difficulty of being a theorist. 
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is internally referential, that is, depends fundamentally on satisfactions or rewards 
generic to that relation itself” (1991a: 244 emphasis added).  Both Bauman and Giddens 
argue that these pure relations emerge from late modernity’s institutional instability.  
They explain that the institutional base is longer capable of grounding ideological 
reference points; wherefore, situational interaction itself becomes the point of reference.   
Although I hold that the contemporary age constitutes a plethora of ephemeral, 
contradicting and confusing narratives, I have not witnessed, nor do I foresee the 
emergence of social interaction—if  I may use a euphemism—without external baggage.  
Likewise, I—as a psychoanalytic scholar—cannot give the notion of the “pure” 
relationship any sincere credence.  The epistemological foundation upon which my 
theoretical scaffolding rests is the idea that one’s embodied subjectivity always and 
necessarily constitutes her life-history.  Part and parcel of this history are the cultural 
contexts one has traversed throughout her life-course.   
Yet, we must acknowledge that these theorists touch upon a legitimate point.  
The individual can, at times, operate outside of conventional dictates.  Both Meursault 
and Ribordy, for example, adopted noninstitutionalized, systems of morality based on 
loyalty to the present experience.  Yet do such men and such acts fall under the purview 
of what Ulrich Beck (2002) refers to as a “cosmopolitan conscience”?  We may 
remember from the introduction to this dissertation that said conscience seeks to 
incorporate the “otherness” of the other.  Meursault murdered a man who posed no 
immediate threat to him.  In so doing, he demonstrates radical authenticity.  The irony is 
that while authenticity is a conventional value, in practice it may very well appear 
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abhorrent to the conventional sensibility.  Furthermore, our theoretical endeavors often 
take for granted that the authentic act will present itself as noble and praiseworthy.   
With that said, social science on the whole could mitigate some of its naive 
assumptions by looking to psychoanalysis.  One of the pinnacle contributions of 
psychoanalytic discourse is the idea that the authentic does not represent the 
transcendence of a vulgar human condition; rather, it represents a liberated acceptance of 
said condition.  On this point, we should acknowledge that Meursault and Ribordy are 
not sadistic men; yet their actions are far removed from the Heinz dilemma31.  The 
question before us, then, is: how do we, our institutions, incorporate the “otherness” of 
morally or aesthetically unpalatable others?  I do not have a satisfying answer to this 
question. Though we may acknowledge that systemic repression exacerbates the 
problem and power of dirt, we may also acknowledge that institutional integration of the 
dirty will likely entail systemic discordance.   
I do, however, suggest that the embodied experience serve as a referential 
measure for moral and aesthetic decisions concerning social existence. Such a reference 
point is one choice among others.  That which is moral, as I employ said concept, 
mitigates experiential violence and facilitates experiential growth; moral acts attempt to 
bridge experiential discontinuity so that the organism can circumvent the hazard of 
trauma and adapt to a new mode of experience (establish a new sense of trust).    
                                                 
31 The Heinz dilemma refers to a moral puzzle developed by Lawrence Kohlberg (1981) to test moral 
reasoning.  It presents a hypothetical scenario in which Heinz requires medicine for his sick, but does not 
have the money to pay for it. The moral question at hand then is should Heinz steal the medicine.   
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At this stipulation, the reader may protest: Are the systemic actions taken against 
Meursault and Ribordy not representative of the systemic attempt to mitigate or 
circumvent experiential discontinuity and subsequent violence that the mere presence of 
Meursault and Ribordy create for the normative order?  These men, after all, challenge 
the collective fantasy that portrays the experiential universe as safe, well ordered and 
manageable.  With that said, the reader—if only to play devil’s advocate—may inquire: 
Why should we not treat Meursault and Ribordy as sacrificial lambs?  Their stories 
challenge our shared understandings and collective efficacy.  Why not, then, permit 
violence upon a few to ensure the comfort of the many?   
The answer is that experiential discontinuity, in and of itself, need not be 
traumatic.  Experience will always be dirty.  The experiential, by its nature, spills over 
and undermines cultural constructs and concomitant habitudes.  “Deflection of,” then, is 
not as effective as “adaption to” experiential discordance and the emergence of new 
experiential understanding.  Furthermore, our efforts at repression reveal glaring 
contradictions and deficiencies within our social structural machinery; our fantasies of 
purity become increasingly absurd as systemic authorities attempt to maintain cultural 
values of justice through the dubious means of a pretrial agreement.  Consequently, 
modes of social protection take on an anomic character; an insatiable need for comfort 
and security promotes deranged social arrangements.   
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Experiential Growth 
What then is experiential growth? At the institutional level, growth refers to how the 
institutional structure changes in a way that better enables organisms to achieve 
affective-experiential integration (achieve primary trust) with the sociocultural 
environment.  However, the character of institutionalized ethos is such that organisms 
often experience its codification as inflexible and affectively unreasonable.  If an 
institution fails to take on the character of a living, breathing organism that needs to 
adapt and grow, it will succumb to inertia and cease to be functional for the cells 
(individuals) that make up its constitution.  The dynamism of both the organism’s 
experiential constitution and the structural constitution of the environment necessitates 
that the relationship between the two will come into discord.  In the event that the 
organism does not (or cannot) adapt to a particular structural circumstance, the 
disjuncture between organism’s affective constitution and environment may manifest as 
a tension that builds without relief.    
One problematic praxis responsible for such maladaptation is the 
institutionalization of purity.  Although this particular value has inundated all facets of 
social existence, in practice it remains unsustainable.  Narratives of purity exacerbate 
symbolic alienation.  The organism’s experiential understanding does not align with 
purity’s symbolic logic. If we, as a collective, can relinquish the desire for and fantasy of 
systemic purity, then we can develop structures that adapt to experiential needs—
structures which do not attempt to clean experiential dirt, but rather make use of it.  A 
praxis that forgoes purity better equips the organism to confront and work through 
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discordant experiences.  Wherefore, such a praxis promotes, rather than hinders, primary 
trust.   
 
New Directions for Future Research  
Scholars may employ the ideas developed throughout this dissertation in a number of 
different avenues of research.  The concept of the dirty Other, for example, expands 
discussions of otherness beyond a concern for the non-normative or a politics of 
difference.  Specifically, the dirty Other (or shit) concerns a systemic repression of the 
familiar, yet troubling subject or object.  In the present work, I apply this concept to 
highlight how legal formalities and procedures deflect and repress aberrant experiential 
accounts to obfuscate systemic shortcomings.  Future studies, however, may apply this 
concept to other social problems and institutions.   
An apt subject for analysis is liquid modern society’s relationship to a growing 
trash burden.  Edward Humes (2012) notes, “Trash is such a big part of daily life that 
American communities spend more on waste management than on fire protection, parks 
and recreation, libraries or schoolbooks.  If it were a [commercial] product, trash would 
surpass everything else we manufacture.”  A researcher may inquirer, then, what the role 
of waste management entails in relation to the larger social world.  Does trash itself 
represent a dirty Other?  Does systemic repression obfuscate and perpetuate the growing 
problem of trash?  Does said problem undermine the organism’s primary trust in a 
consumption driven environing?   
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 Perhaps one might apply the concept of the dirty Other to the advent of germ 
theory.  One may argue that with the recognition of the widespread existence of 
microorganisms, modern culture promulgated a phobic disposition towards the everyday 
world.  David S. Barnes (2004) historical comparative analysis of the sewage crises in 
London and Paris in the late 1880s insinuates such a relationship. He argues that Louis 
Pasteur’s promulgation of germ theory served as a hindrance to the Parisian 
Government’s ability to undertake swift and effective action toward meliorating the 
city’s sewage problems.  He elaborates that the introduction of bacteriological 
knowledge presented Parisian officials with a newfound danger, complicating their 
understanding of what “safe,” appropriate action entailed.  We, following Barnes’ lead, 
may surmise that the invisibility and ubiquity of microbes bolsters their threatening 
presence.  The body’s permeability and vulnerability acquires a newfound salience.  
Future studies may explore these stipulations empirically.  Specifically, a researcher 
might investigate the prevalence and latent consequences of germ management in 
everyday praxis.   
Returning to a consideration for Ribordy’s experience with the Military Justice 
System, we may acknowledge the need for a discussion about the influence of legal 
logical and processes upon Ribordy’s memory.  Research shows that memories are 
highly malleable and susceptible to external influences (Freud 1899; Siegel 1999; Loftus 
2005).  Wherefore, one may investigate how legal proceedings operate in a way that 
potentially distorts not only experiential accounts, but actual memories of the events in 
question.   
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Furthermore, we should acknowledge that Ribordy’s circumstance is not wholly 
unique.  A number of other soldiers accused of wrong doing face the same or similar 
legal cleansing processes. Stjepan Mestrovic (2006; 2007; 2008; 2009; 2010; 2012) and 
others (Caldwell 2012; Caldwell and Mestrovic 2008; Mestrovic and Caldwell 2010; 
Mestrovic and Lorenzo 2008; Romero and Mestrovic 2012) have produce a great 
amount of research on the subject of war crimes and the military’s systemic 
inadequacies.  Nevertheless, new cases continue to emerge and further study is still 
appropriate.  Such research is not only timely, but may contribute to potential, systemic 
restructuring of the Military Justice System.32  Also, the need for research regards the 
military’s systemic inadequacies extends beyond the legal system.  There are now more 
Iraq and Afghanistan veteran suicides than there are U.S. soldier casualties from active 
duty in Iraq and Afghanistan (Pilkington 2013).  Such a comparison reveals the need to 
explore and critique the processes of existing the battlefield and reentering (or 
reintegration with) civilian living.  The concepts I develop in chapter two may be of use 
towards this end.  One may investigate how present day institutions are failing to 
facilitate the soldier’s ability to achieve experiential growth and primary trust—
embodied processes that mitigate the effects of trauma.   
Having acknowledged several avenues of possible research, we must not forget 
that the body and the embodied experience play a key role in social on-goings.  The 
researcher’s failure to centralize these concepts in an analysis of social processes may 
                                                 
32 We may note that Dr. Mestrovic has not only served as an expert witness for many of the present day 
War Crime trials (see Mestrovic 2007; 2008; 2010a; 2010b), but has also consulted the Military Justice 
System about its systemic inadequacies (United States Department of Defense 2013).   
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lead her astray in several distinct ways.  Firstly, the researcher may mistakenly recognize 
a lack of structural constraint or order as an opportunity for agentic action.  As I have 
already alluded to throughout this dissertation, lack of structure does not necessarily 
bode well for the embodied experience.  When a cultural narrative reveals itself as 
contradictory, the organism may not experience such a circumstance with a sense of 
liberation and possibility; rather, she may respond defensively with denial and fear.   
Secondly, the researcher may inappropriately regard the embodied experience as 
something the organism can or should circumvent.  If we accept that the embodied 
experience is the modus operandi of human existence, we must acknowledge that agentic 
action occurs through, not in spite of, affective processes.  In other words, we may 
acknowledge that the organism employs her affective constitution as an adaptive force 
within and throughout social intercourse.  Lastly, the researcher may overemphasize the 
cognitive-analytic process of the mind and mentation and thereby obfuscate the presence 
and significance of an affective intelligibility.  In such a circumstance, the researcher 
may inappropriately conflate lack of analytical knowledge for lack of experiential 
understanding.  I have already argued that these concepts refer to distinct processes and 
have different consequences for subsequent action.  With that said, I conclude this 
dissertation with the following stipulation: neither self nor society emerge, first and 
foremost, as an affair of symbolic identities; rather, they emerge, first and foremost, as 
an affair of corporealities.   
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